Re: [EM] A "Runoff" type method for resolution of cycles incondorcet

[Dave Ketchum]

Reason I choke on this thread is that this idea inflicts strategy on 
Condorcet I have to warn my voters that ranking even a minor candidate in 
front of me can get me discarded.

Condorcet should stay with voters ranking purely by desires.

Dave

On Tue, 27 Apr 2004 22:55:21 -0400 Ken Taylor wrote:


At 10:30 AM -0400 4/27/04, Ken Taylor wrote:

> At 10:21 AM -0400 4/27/04, Ken Taylor wrote:

>I'm dropping the weakest candidate, as defined by number of first
>choice votes, which causes all their defeats of other candidates
>to be dropped.
What will you do when two or more candidates are tied for least first
choice votes?

I'm not sure. There are probably several different ways to deal with

this,

and I don't think it's very relevant to evaluating the procedure in

general.

If you were to drop all candidates tied for least first choice votes,
it seems possible that your method could not claim to be cloneproof.
Two or more clones could evenly split the vote and then all be
eliminated even if they, in combination, had > 50% of the vote,
implying that one of the clones should win.

Ahhh this is a good point. I may have underestimated the impact that a
tie-resolution strategy could have. Though, the larger the election, the
less likely that such a tie could occur.
I'm still curious as to my original question -- has this overall method been
proposed before, and what possible weakness does it have (assuming that the
tie-for-last-place problem can be solved)?
Ken
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 Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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