Ken,
--- Ken Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> I was, until recently, a fanatical advocate of Approval. I tried to
> demonstrate by empirical simulation the superiority of Approval over
> rank methods, based on the criterion that the election method should
> maximize "social utility" as defined by sincere CR. (See my earlier post
> in Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #597, Message 4.) Unfortunately, it
> didn't turn out the way I expected. In a single-issue election with many
> candidates, Approval exhibited abysmal performance, worse than all other
> methods (including Plurality). So I gave up my crusade. Oh well.
I have to confess that I didn't understand your simulations when you
posted them. Maybe you recall that I posted some simulation results at
about the same time.
Mine found certain scenarios (i.e., assumptions about voter behavior and
information) where Approval was marginally better than Schulze. This was
measured by comparing the sincere CR/social utility of the winners of the
two methods.
I did not test Plurality. I think it is very strange that you found it to
be better than Approval. I cannot imagine what voter strategy you supposed
for the two methods in order to get that result. I imagine that Approval
voters would still approve the candidate they would pick under Plurality,
so I take it the voters in your Approval simulations were approving too
many candidates?
Kevin Venzke
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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