James Gilmour said:
No, there is no sophistry in my argument.
I reply:
Call it what you want. You're saying we shoudn't respect the voted wishes of those people because you think that they might change their preferences. Does it occur to you that that is a rather weak argument for disregarding someone's voted wishes?
Though you're not at all clear about what you mean, you seem to be implying that you mean that when people find out that C is favorite of fewest, then people who prefer C to B will feel a need to follow the herd, and the fact that C is favorite of fewest will make those people begin to prefer B to C, because B has a higher Plurality score than C does. Whatever reasons made those people prefer C to B, they'll consider Plurality score to be a more important thing to judge the candidates by,and so now they'll think that B must be better than C. Is that pretty much how your reasoning goes?
Adam had said:
You're essentially saying that those preferences shouldn't be respected, since the people wouldn't actually express them if they had thought they mattered.
You then said:
No. that is not what I am saying. I am suggesting they would vote sincerely but then reject the
outcome of their own actions when they saw the consequences and all the evidence.
I reply:
You mean the dire consequence that someone whom they prefer to B mighrt win instead of B? :-)
What is "all the evidence"? The fact that C doesn't get a high Plurality score? They're going to judge candidates by their Pluralitly score instead of by the practical criteria which initially informed their preferences?
You continued:
I am also
suggesting that if they fully understood that such outcomes were possible, they would reject a
voting system that could produce such an outcome.
I reply:
One issue at a time, if you don't mind. But now you're saying that if they knew that Condorcet would elect someone whom they prefer more, that would cause them to reject Condorcet and choose IRV, because it would elect someone whom they prefer less.
>This is about more than voting arithmetic and measures for identifying
>"the most representative candidate". It brings in systems of values which >are expressed in different dimensions from those used to measure representativity.
Adam had said:
I don't understand this.
I reply:
James was talking gibberish, and I doubt that anyone could know what he was trying to say.
James replied:
That is exactly the problem. NB nothing personal, just a general observation about much of the
discussion on this list.
I reply:
What is exactly the problem? The fact that people don't know what you mean when you talk gibberish, and then fail to explain what you meant?
Are you trying to say that people might not vote in a way that pairwise counting measures meaningfully? If so, could you justify that?
James said:
...but all my political experience leads me to believe that such a result would provoke a
massive public outcry and demands for immediate changes to the voting system.
I reply:
If you want pubic resenrtment of the outcome, then let IRV avoidably elect someone over whom a majority have expressed preference for someone else. That majority loser whom IRV elects will never have the legitimacy that the CW would have.
You continued:
As others have appreciated, such a response operates on a different dimension from that used to
assess "representativity" as defined by the comparisons of Condorcet, IRV, etc. You may think this
contrary, but we know from political surveys that real people are quite capable of holding contrary
views and even mutually incompatible views. So while they might accept the CW on one dimension,
they will reject the outcome of the election on another dimension. I don't have a neat definition
for that dimension, but it is characterised by the reactions I suggested in the two different
scenarios, ie accept CW if 32/35/33, but reject CW if 3/49/48.
I reply:
So you justify your prediction by a "dimension", for which you don't have a defiintition, except that it is characterized by the prediction which you use it to justify.
You say that there would be an "outcry" when Condorcet elected C, in your example. Who is going to do the outrcrying? The majority who prefer C to B, or the majority who prefer C to A? :-)
Mike Ossipoff
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