Ken Johnson wrote: >The proposed "Normalized CR" method is as >follows: >(1) Voters give candidates CR ratings. There no need for any range limit >- any finite CR value, positive or negative, can be allowed. >(2) Apply an additive shift to each voter's CR profile so that the sum >of the absolute values is minimized. >(3) Apply a multiplicative scale factor to each voter's CR profile so >that the sum of the absolute values is 1. >(4) After applying the above transformations, select the candidate with >the highest average CR. > >The basic idea is that scaling the sum of the absolute values to 1 is a >better way of limiting individual voting power than restricting >individual CR's to a fixed range (e.g. 0 to 1). With a fixed range, the >optimum strategy is to give all candidates polarized ratings - >equivalent to Approval. But the above normalization process removes the >incentive for voters to polarize their ratings, and they are more likely >to vote sincerely. (At least that's my hypothesis, I'm not sure if it's >actually true.)
I doubt it would be true. My first guess at a strategy: 1) Identify the two frontrunners, and pick your favorite among them. 2) Give your favorite frontrunner a 10, your less favored frontrunner a 0, and everyone else a 5. This maximizes your impact on the important contest - the one between the frontrunners. -Adam ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info