First, I don't believe that Condorcet wv has a serious strategy problem. We've often discussed the defensive truncation strategy. Here's how I often word it: The only way you can steal the election from other voters is if they were trying to help you. Doesn't that make you proud of yourself?
Also, Adam has pointed out that defensive equal rankng also reliably protects CWs. It's the basis of AERLO.
Because I've recently defined AERLO & ATLO here, there's no need to repeat those definitions here.
For Condorcet wv, they provide easier protection of a CW, they conver ESC compliance, and they ensure that the person who considers the candidates to be in 2 sets such that the merit differences within the 2 sets is negligible compared to the merit difference between the 2 sets has no incentive to not sincerely rank the better-set candidates.
Those options also confer benefits and additional criterion compliances on other rank methods, such as Bucklin, as I've described in previous postings.
I've also proposed options that are more automatic than those. I'll repeat some of their definitions:
Order Estimate Option:
The voter can indicate, on hir ballot, what order s/he estimates the candidates to have, in a 1-dimensional issue space or political spectrum. Then, if there's a circular tie that hir favorite didn't win, and if each member of that circular tie is majority-beaten by another member of the circular tie, then, if some people who voted the winner over that voter's favorite have ranked someone over that voter's favorite in contradiction with that voter's estimated political spectrum order, and if that voter's favorite would have otherwise won, then (depending on which the voter chose) that winner would be dropped from that voter's ranking, or everyone whom that voter ranks over that winner would be promoted to 1st place in that voter's ranking.
[end of order-estimate option definition]
Unanimity Option
When I posted about this some time ago, I defined the Unanimity Option in detail. For now, I'll just say that choosing that option means that if there certain attributes of the comparison of the unanimity of some of the defeats in a circular tie, and if your favorite doesn't win that circular tie, and if all the defeats in that circular tie are majority defeats, then that triggers the dropping of certain candidates or (depending on which you chose) the promotion of certain candidates to 1st place in your ranking.
A complete description is in the archives.
Ranked Majority Defeat Disqualification (RMDD) further reduces defensive strategy need. In fact it eliminates defensive strategy need. It eliminates the lesser-of-2-evils problem.
That benefit comes at the cost of the occasional inconvenience of having to disqualify all the candidates, if they all lose, and hold a new election with all new candidates.
If one wants the ultimate freedom from defensive strategy need, it's worth that occasional inconvenience.
Mike Ossipoff
_________________________________________________________________
Stop worrying about overloading your inbox - get MSN Hotmail Extra Storage! http://join.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200362ave/direct/01/
---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
