I already said this, but it was buried in a long posting, and I wanted to say it with its own subject-line.
If the A & B voters apply ATLO below their favorite, and rank sincerely, the co-operation/defection dilemma in James' example doesn't happen. Defection is foiled. In particular, when the A voters use ATLO and vote sincerely, the B voters, if they truncate or order-reverse against A, can't accomplish anything but the election of C. They'd know that, and they wouldh't try it.
Mike Ossipoff
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