On Jun 10, 2004, at 3:11 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
45 A 100 > B 70 > C 0 10 B 100 > A 70 > C 0 5� B 100 > C 70> A 0 40 C 100 > B 70 > A 0
45 A 100 > B 10 > C 0 10 B 100 > A 90 > C 0 5� B 100 > C 90 > A 0 40 C 100 > B 10 > A 0
>Yup. Both are decided by plain Condorcet, which only considers rankings
>not ratings, and B wins. Of the methods on my Election Calculator, only
>IRV selects A. B is the compromise candidate. Everyone is happy enough
>with B
>In your second example, B being devalued and B-voters throwing in more
>with A, IRNR picks this up and selects A (rank-only methods other than IRV
>still choose B):
Thanks for putting my examples into your Election Calculator. One question though, how does it translate the cardinal ratings into Approval ballots?
Your Election Calculator translates both examples into the Approval result:
A 55 B 100 C 45
Surely using the zero information strategy of� "approve all candidates whose cardinal rating� is greater than the mean cardinal rating" the second example should give the Approval result:
A 55 B 15 C 45
Hmm, Perhaps I ought to implement that zero-info strategy. What it actually does right now is that any rating greater than zero counts as approval. I normally think of ratings in positive-negative scales, -1.0 to 1.0, -100 to 100, etc. Of course that voting strategy is applicable no matter what the range. It might make it easier to compare Approval against other methods, instead of having to shuffle ratings around zero to use the fixed approval cutoff.
Brian Olson http://bolson.org/
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