Dear Chris Benham, you wrote (15 June 2004): > Judging by the example at Steve Eppley's site, it seems > to meet his (similar) "Non-Drastic Defense" criterion.
This is Steve Eppley's "Non-Drastic Defense" criterion: > Non-Drastic Defense: Each voter must be allowed to vote > as many alternatives tied for top as she wishes, and for > all x e A, x must not be elected if there exists y e A > such that that more than half of the voters vote y over x > and no worse than tied for top. Here is an example where ER-IRV(fractional) violates Steve Eppley's "Non-Drastic Defense" criterion: 20 A=B=C>E>... 20 A=B=D>E>... 20 A=C=D>E>... 7 B>E>... 7 C>E>... 7 D>E>... 38 E>... A majority of the voters strictly prefers candidate A to candidate E and ranks candidate A tied for top. Nevertheless, candidate E is the winner. Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
