Hi, There is a possible compromise between margins and majorities (but I prefer straight majorities, not this compromise):
If the voter leaves two candidates unranked, don't count that as a half vote for each, count it as zero for each. But if the voter explicitly ranks two candidates as equal, count that as a half vote for each. Thus, if more than half the voters rank x but not y, then y cannot have a count over any z that is as large as the majority for x over y. This means it's straightforward to satisfy the minimal defense criterion; for instance, the corresponding variations of MAM and BeatpathWinner satisfy minimal defense. Truncation resistance, as I've defined it in my webpages, is also satisfied. --Steve ------------- James G-A wrote: > Sorry, I just said that Blake's argument treated the fairness of margins > as an axiom in itself, but now I realize that he does provide a specific > justification for it. > > I quote from > http://lists.topica.com/lists/RankedPairs/read/message.html?mid=1600781094&sort=d&start=15 > > Blake wrote: > >The argument for using margins is fairly straight-forward. If the > >voters on the winning side are evidence that a proposition is true, than > >the voters on the losing side are evidence against it. Therefore, it > >makes sense to consider both when deciding our confidence in the > >decision. That was Condorcet's approach. View the election in terms of > >evidence and probability. That is my approach as well. However not > >everyone agrees. > > This is a good point. However, I still think that the strategic issue > gets more priority. When Condorcet made this probabilistic argument, I > doubt that he was taking strategic manipulation into account. > ---- ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info