On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 11:29:48 -0700 Steve Eppley wrote:
Hi,
James G-A wrote:
Has anyone clearly advanced this pro-Condorcet argument? I think that it is devastating to methods which are not
Condorcet efficient.
-snip-
If there is a Condorcet winner with regard to the sincere preference rankings of voters, and the voting method is plurality, then the Vote is only at equilibrium when the Condorcet winner is selected.
-snip-
Another positive argument for Condorcet-consistency uses the single-elimination pairwise voting procedure recommended by Robert's Rules, instead of plurality rule. I presume the Robert's Rules procedure is used much more than any other voting procedure, which, if true, lends strength to the argument.
Most of the people reading this, I assume, are aware that under the Robert's Rules procedure, the Condorcet winner (when there is one) will be chosen, assuming either that every voter votes sincerely or that every voter is strategically sophisticated and knows the preferences of all the voters.
HUH???
The Robert's example is IRV.
One of IRV's problems is that it, too often, picks a winner different than Condorcet (even assuming there IS a Condorcet winner).
NOW, if the "assuming" that I read excludes the IRV problem cases, it seems misleading to me.
--Steve
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