Warren Schudy wrote: > As I understand it, your scheme, unlike regular approval, > fails the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC). -snip-
And fails clone independence. A huge spoiler problem. It would maintain the "two-party, one nominee per party" system. I'm not sure why Philippe thinks it's a problem if each voter can select more than one candidate. What criterion does that violate, and how is that criterion justified? > BTW, I just noticed that (regular) approval is equivalent to > Condorcet methods with the stipulation that all voters must > consider all candidates to be in one of two equivalent sets > (aka dichotomous). This is very similar to a statement in > the book "Approval Voting", by Braham or something. Steven Brams, I presume. But it's such an unimportant property, since it's laughably unrealistic to assume voters' sincere preferences are dichotomous when there are more than two candidates. It's a product of the "publish or perish" syndrome, most likely. Why not go a little further and assume the voters' sincere preferences are such that they are unanimously agreed there's one particular candidate that should be selected? That would be only slightly more implausible. --Steve ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info