Coming in late to the discussion, I'd like to contribute an angle I didn't read being expressed (sorry if I missed it).

In the example:
A > B > C > D > E
        BUT
        E > B > C > D

I think the voter is trying to explicitly encode the kind of strategy that many of us are explicitly trying to prevent being exploited.

So, another way to say it:
I really really want A, but I really really don't want my E vote to detract from that.
But if I can't have A, I want E.


I think the second half of that second restatement is key. That a vote for some other choice not detract from the favorite.

I would guess that IRV is a good fit to Kislanko's desires from a voting system.

Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/

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