David, You wrote (Sat.Sept.11):
CB: I haven't yet made up my mind what the best ranked-ballot PR method is yet, but if the ballots are symetrically completed,With regard to the example:
A 61 A>B 60 C>D 50 D>C 9
for 2 seats, I'd be interested in knowing who list members think should win and why.
and then those ballots that ranked A first are all fractioanlly devalued by an amount that sums to a Droop quota (180/3 = 60),
then the winners are A and C.
Multiplying all the numbers by six, the symetrically completed ballots are:
61: A>B>C>D 61: A>B>D>C 61: A>C>B>D 61: A>C>D>B 61: A>D>B>C 61: A>D>C>B 180:A>B>C>D 180:A>B>D>C 150:C>D>A>B 150:C>D>B>A 27: D>C>A>B 27: D>C>B>A
With the numbers multiplied again , this time by 121 (726 times the starting numbers), my numbers for the last seat look like:
14701:B>C 14701:B>D 03721:C>B 40021:C>D 03721:D>B 10255:D>C
C has more than half the first prefernces, and so wins.
In a Dec.1994 something Woodall wrote, I've seen an arguement that says that in multi-winner STV it is better to handle truncation by
reducing the size of the quota (as ballots "exhaust") rather than symetrically complete them.
First election, for two seats: 40:A>B 02:B>A 12:C>D 06:D>C The quota is 20, so A and B are neatly elected.
Second election, this time for three seats:
40:A>B
02:B>A
12:C>D
06:D>C
180:E
The quota is now 60, so E is easily elected. If the ballots are symetrically completed, the other winners are A and C.
The arguement goes that compared to the first election the only changes are that there is an extra seat and a lot of new voters
who have expressed no desire to do anything other than have E fill that seat, and therfore it is absurd that C should now be
elected instead of B.
Chris Benham
---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
