Paul didn't reject anything. > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > ] On Behalf Of Eric Gorr > Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 2004 5:26 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: [EM] Does MAM use the Copeland method? > > At 3:12 PM -0700 10/6/04, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote: > >On Oct 6, 2004, at 2:58 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote: > >>But, to use the terminology and techniques y'all do, let's > examine the > >>BALLOTS that result if B is not a candidate: > >> > >>4: A>C > >>5: C>A > >> > >>Adding B to the mix causes A to be elected, even though all > voters who > >>prefer B over anybody voted A third of the 3. > > > >Okay, I think that's what most people here call the 'spoiler' effect. > >I don't remember the original example, but it sounds like > yes, that's a > >problem. > > It's more accurately termed a failure Independence of > Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which no ranked ballot method > can satisfy. Both B & C are irrelevant alternatives for MAM > since neither won using MAM. > > So, based on Paul's comments, Paul will reject all ranked > ballot methods if he expects them to satisfy IIA. > > > > > > ---- > Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > for list info >
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