On Fri, Nov 05, 2004 at 06:05:05PM -0800, Dr.Ernie Prabhakar wrote: > On Nov 1, 2004, at 1:27 PM, Andrew Myers wrote: > >I thought people might be interested to know about some > >recent improvements to the Condorcet Internet Voting Service at > >http://www5.cs.cornell.edu/~andru/civs. > > > >* It now implements three different completion rules, including > > MAM, Beatpath Winner, and a deterministic variant of MAM. > > I presume this"deterministic variant " is what you call CIVS Ranked > Pairs: > > http://www5.cs.cornell.edu/~andru/civs/rp.html > >The major difference between CIVS Ranked Pairs and MAM is the rule on > >when to keep a preference. A preference is kept exactly when it does > >not create any new cycles when considered in conjunction with strictly > >stronger, kept preferences. Thus, preferences of equal strength may be > >kept even though in conjunction they produce a new cycle, as long as > >individually they do not. > > This sounds to me that Same-Sized Majorities with no other > differentiators will lead to cycles, and CIVS specifies no mechanism > for breaking that, and is thus incomplete. Is that correct? > > -- Ernie P.
That is correct, and intentional. CIVS RP doesn't have either of the two random tie-breaking mechanisms in MAM, which are necessary to ensure that you always obtain a total ordering of the alternatives. -- Andrew ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info