Dear Chris! I though some time about your proposal and have some comments:
First of all, it it not Condorcet, is it? It seems to me that in the following example, it will elect A though C is the CW: 2 A>C>B 4 A>B>C 4 C>B>A 1 C>A>B 2 B>C>A Defeats A>B(7:6), C>A(7:6), C>B(7:6), hence C is the CW. No candidate is disapproved by a majority (A:6, B:3, C:4). A is most preferred (6), B is least disapproved (3), hence A wins! Did you check any other criteria? I always try Condorcet and monotonicity first. I fear the latter is quite improbable because of the detail "If not all the candidates are rated as Disapproved by a majority..." and because of the IRV-like promotion in step (3). I find the idea of reducing to two candidates which are optimal in different senses somewhat attractive. It reminds me of a suggestion of Forest who proposed to reduce to three candidates first and then drop the weakest defeat in case of a cycle. Yours, Jobst ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info