On Sun, 2 Jan 2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Brian,
--- Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :If a majority of all the voters prefer X to Y, then they should have a way of voting that ensures that Y won't win, without any member of that majority voting a less-liked candidate over a more-liked one.
I think IRNR has this. I think IRNR is a strict improvement on straight Cardinal Rating summation, except for the computational burden.
I'm not so sure about this... What if X is the majority faction's fifth choice? It is easy to imagine X being eliminated in this case, only a little harder to imagine Y going on to win. Maybe that can't happen, though.
The rule asserts that there is a relatively honest vote _possible_ to create a certain outcome. There are also votes possible that fail to generate that outcome.
IRNR elects choice F for the following, and indeed E is the first one eliminated. And if these are honest ratings/utilities then I clam that F is the correct choice.
*51 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5 *49 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0 http://betterpolls.com/et?vrr=-r&if=-f&cand=6&seats=1&data=*51+1.0%2C+0.9%2C+0.8%2C+0.7%2C+0.6%2C+0.5%0D%0A*49+0.0%2C+0.0%2C+0.0%2C+0.0%2C+0.0%2C+1.0
But, the majority _can_ veto choice F by the following, where A is chosen by IRNR:
*51 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.0 *49 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0
http://betterpolls.com/et?vrr=-r&if=-f&cand=6&seats=1&data=*51+1.0%2C+0.9%2C+0.8%2C+0.7%2C+0.6%2C+0.0%0D%0A*49+0.0%2C+0.0%2C+0.0%2C+0.0%2C+0.0%2C+1.0
IRNR is one of the methods I've programmed using Forest's information on producing triangles to draw all the results for a method using three ballot types. One alarming thing I noticed is that IRNR doesn't always elect a majority favorite. Suppose the ballot types are A, B, and C>B. Even if the C>B faction makes up a majority, they can get C eliminated by giving B too high of a score.
Yes, and I claim that is a correct result. Ratings based election methods are more capable of finding good compromise candidates. I think a lot of talk of rankings assumes that there is a great difference in utility between every step from 1st to 2nd and so on. IRV/STV certainly assumes this by putting your whole vote on your first choice and only if you can't have that transferring your whole vote to your second choice (and so on). But with ratings there is more information available, and it might turn out that I have two or three close favorites (say, Cobb, Nader and Kerry or Badnarik, Buchannon and Bush). I can rate those six candidates something like: 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.2, 0.1, 0.0 . That means it would be pretty much OK with me to go with my 2nd or 3rd choices.
I think it's a better result, for optimizing social utility, to go with the second choice of the majority that mostly satisfies 70-80% of the people than to just go with the favorite of 51%.
Brian Olson http://bolson.org/
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