Forest wrote: > Actually, DSV with Strategy A can sometimes converge to a stable > equilibrium even when there is no Condorcet Winner: > > 4900 C > 2400 B > 2700 A>B
You're right. I forgot to disclose my assumption of strict preferences. A better way to say what I meant: When for every candidate X there is another candidate Y that is strictly preferred by a majority of voters to candidate X, there is no equilibrium under Approval when every voter uses strategy A. Also, I forgot to mention that the results of my example election under the different DSV modes assume that all voters use strategy A. > [In my opinion this is unfortunate, since it would be better to > have B and C win with about equal probability in this example.] Why, do you think? Candidate A can't win under Approval no matter what (unless some voters are completely irrational), so the A-first voters have strong motivation to approve B. Plus, a majority strictly prefers B to C. ===== Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - You care about security. So do we. http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
