I often post to comment on postings that are about methods that I advocate or strategies that I suggest, especially when someone expresses concerns about those methods or strategies. To not comment would often leave people with a misleading impression gotten from that personīs posting, especially if their posting expressed a lot of confusion about the subject.
Iīve never felt that I should only comment on a posting if the poster likes me or welcomes my comments. Iīve never felt that I shouldnīt comment on someoneīs posting just because they might react by going into a rage. I shouldnīt have to make an exception for Russ.
Russ Paielli said:
You make a good point. The fundamental problem, I think, is semantic: the word "strategy" is misleading with regard to voting in an Approval election.
In the context of voting systems, the word "strategy" normally implies insincerity, but there is really no "insincerity" involved in voting in an Approval election.
I comment:
Weīve been all over that. Itīs common knowledge on EM that "strategy" is used in a number of different ways. No one but Russ believes that itīs misleading to speak of Approval strategy. In fact he had at his website 4 articles whose titles contained the words "Approval Strategy".
No one has said that strategy must be insincere.
Last summer, summer ī04, I posted 2 or 3 definitions of strategy, different ways in which that word is used. The words ĻstrategyĻ & maybe "definition" are probably in the subject line of that posting.
Strategy often refers to a way of voting, when that way of voting is discussed or evaluated with regard to how good it is for that voter, as regards outcome. Thatīs the more general definition.
In the name of the Strategy-Free Criterion, Iīm using that word differently. I clarified that meaning in my posting last summer. Iīm not writing that definition in this posting, but, just as a rough description, strategy, by that definition, involves doing other than truly voting all of oneīs preferences, to optimize oneīs outcome. Maybe that, itself, would be a good definition. Maybe last summerīs definition referred to the use of information.
So let me summarize these definitions of strategy:
1. A way of voting, when itīs discussed or evaluated with regard to how good it is for the person who votes it, in terms of outcome.
2. The wording of that definition last summer.
3. A way of voting other than voting all of oneīs preferences, done to optimize the voterīs outcome.
4. The version of #3 that I posted last summer, which may have referred to the use of information.
[end of list of strategy definitions]
Of course, by #3, all Approval or Plurality voting is strategic, if itīs intended to optimze outcome--likewise voting where ranking-length is limited. Voting a short ranking because of laziness or hurry isnīt strategy by that definition.
Anyway, as I said, no one has said that strategy must be insincere.
Russ said:
The issue of vote optimization in Approval has been analyzed quite thoroughly, but it doesn't address the question of how an Approval election can be manipulated.
I comment:
Presumably this refers to dishonest poll-answering, addressed below.
Russ continued:
As far as I know, however, the issue of pre-election poll-response strategy has barely been scratched.
I comment:
Maybe thatīs because polls with verifiabe balloting are pretty much unknown. And without verifiable balloting it would be pontless to discuss dishonest poll-answering. Discussion of such polls is a discussion about something that is rarely, if ever, proposed, much less found.
Russ continued:
As I wrote before, I am only pointing out a potential pitfall. If it turns out that the best poll-response strategy is simply to be honest, then Approval is in great shape.
I comment:
We should all thank Russ for his reassurance. :-)
Russ continues:
Until we know that, however, the "effectiveness" of Approval is unknown.
I comment:
Russ never was very clear about what he means by "effectiveness". If it has to do with problems resulting from the need for polls in which answers and count and reporting are all reliably honest, then, itīs been abundantly pointed out that Approval doesnīt need reliable pre-election polls. Approval voters can use information from previous elections. And they can use any additional information that they have. In the 1st Approval election, they can vote 0-info. Thatīs "effective" for maximizing expectation, though it isnīt optimal when thereīs information on which to base another strategy.
Russ continued:
By the way, I realize that one can always fall back on the "zero-information strategy." That is not a panacea, however, because then the voter is throwing out all information, which may be too drastic in many cases.
I reply:
Russ seems confused about the matter of when 0-info strategy is intended to be used. Itīs for when thereīs no information on which to base other strategies. No one is throwing out information. One uses 0-info strategy because one doesnīt have the information needed by other strategies.
Russ continued:
Obviously the "zero-information" guidelines are ineffective when only two parties are dominant
I reply:
No, it isnīt a question of "ineffective". When thereīs information that could be make other strategies possible, then 0-info strategy is unnecessary. Then, it can be improved upon. But that doesnīt mean that itīs "ineffective". For instance, when itīs perceived that there are 2 parties whose candidates will be the 2 biggest votegetters in the election, then one could benefit from Best Frontrunner, in its various versions, and so 0-info strategy is unnecessary, though not ineffective.
Russ needs to find different mis-statements to post. Heīs been repeatedly posting the same ones for a long time now, and it would be an improvement if heīd try different ones.
Mike Ossipoff
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