Hi Chris, Nice example. But there is still a counter-strategic incentive under DMC -- see below.
On 24 Mar 2005 at 08:11 UTC-0800, Chris Benham wrote: > Suppose there is pre-polling and so the L supporters > decide to approve C, while the C supporters sincerely > divide their approvals. > Further suppose that the R supporters all decide to > completely Bury C. Then we might get: > > 49 R>L>>C > 06 C>R>>L > 06 C>>R>L > 06 C>>L>R > 06 C>L>>R > 27 L>C>>R > > Now all the candidates are in the top cycle: L>C>R>L. > The approval scores are L82, R55, C51. > > Approval Margins: > L>C 82-51 = +31 > C>R 51-55 = -4 > R>L 55-82 = -27 > > AM elects L, backfiring on the Buriers! > Unfortunately this time DMC eliminates C, and then the > Buriers' candidate R wins. > > Approval-Weighted Pairwise: > L>C 49 > C>R 45 > R>L 06 > > AWP gives the same good result as AM! Yes, with perfect polling knowledge, the R strategy might work. But Rock/Paper/Scissors strategy like this doesn't occur in a vacuum. If R voters are coordinated enough to bury C in both approval and rank, they have to operate on the assumption that C>R>L voters might also suspect something and might all disapprove R instead of splitting. Without C>R>>L's 6 approval votes, R would be eliminated by the definitive C>R defeat. R's ordinal-burial of C would backfire and elect L. If I were an R voter, that would be the *last* thing I'd want! Ted -- araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info