Someone wrote:
The election method which is an elimination method based on the Borda count
is usually known as Nanson's method. It has the very nice property that
if
there is a condorcet winner that the method chooses that candidate.
I reply:
If we use "Condorcet winner" to mean a candidate who, when
compared separately to each of the others, is voted over him
by more voters than vice-versa, then Plurality meets that criterion.
The Condorcet Criterion can be worded in terms of a sincere
Condorcet winner (a candidate who, when compared separately to
each one of the other candidates, is preferred to him by more
voters than vice-versa):
If there's a sincere Condorcet winner, and everyone votes sincerely,
then the sincere Condorcet winner must win.
That wording has the advantage that Plurality doesn't pass, but
some methods do pass.
Obviously a Condorcet Criterion wording that doesn't have those
properties isn't very useful.
So the Condorcet Criterion stipulates sincere voting by everyone.
Good luck :-) That's why the Condorcet Criterion doesn't seem
to be very useful, even when worded in a usable form. FBC,
SARC, WDSC & SDSC offer absolute guarantees to the voter, without
any stipulations. SFC & GSFC only stipulate that no false preferences
are voted, which is a less demanding stipulation than sincere
voting, which, with a rank method, means sincerely ranking all of
the candidates, and forbids truncation.
By the way, I'd like to add that the Smith Criterion,
Condorcet Loser, Majority Loser, & Mutual Majority, all
need to be fixed in the way that Condorcet's Criterion needs to
be fixed, in order to be meetable, but not met by Plurality.
Mike Ossipoff
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