EM list-- Myerson's corruption test, and Myerson's & Weber's voting equilibrium idea both impressed me as important & relevant, but the former is only written about situations with just 2 policy positions, and the latter is only written to apply to point systems--it's good for comparing Plurality, Approval, & Borda. These ideas of theirs seem so important that I'd like to be able to use them more generally. Myerson's corruption test is easier to extend and simplify. I'd like to write my version here, and I hope you'll let me know if you find any problem with it as I've written it: Unanimously-Unpreferred Candidate Criterion (UUCC): If everyone prefers X to Xc, then it shouldn't be possible to contive a situation where Xc wins, and where, if some 1 voter unilaterally changes his vote so as to no longer vote Xc over X, that could cause the election of someone whom that voter likes less than Xc. *** UUCC seems sound to me, but I want to run it by you, in case someone notices some problem with it. Another question: Does Condorcet pass UUCC? Approval passes it, IRV fails it, and Plurality & Borda fail it. (As I said in a previous message about Myerson's test, Borda fails it in a uniquely big way). *** I also want to ask you about extending Myerson's & Weber's voting equilibrium to methods other than point systems, but I'll ask that in a subsequent message. It seems a more difficult goal. *** Mike Ossipoff ________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com
