[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part-
A voting paradox will still exist in several cases in which, at least, the
addition of a close clone will punish its voters.
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D- A clone is a clone is a clone to varying degrees in ANY matrix (2 x 2 to N
x N).
Examples
100 AB
0 BA
net 100 AB
99 CD
1 DC
net 98 CD
98 EF
2 FE
net 96 EF
etc.
51 YZ
49 ZY
net 2 YZ
(with odd number variations)
I note again that a minority will choose the lesser perceived evil(s) in
number voting if its earliest choice(s) cannot win (especially in smaller
minority cases).
40 AB
35 BA
25 CX
X will likely be A or B (otherwise plurality prevails).
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[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part later
'Ere dooz- the simple "confused and irrational voters" system-
2 3 4
A B C
B C A
C A B
Now, let's expect that when a new candidate enters the race, it should
benefit or at least have no effect on the people who preferred the new
candidate to both the "old" and the "new" winner- that is, it genuinely
benefited these voters to support this new option.
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D- See the above clones example and my comments on the 40-25-35 Cretney
example. New clone candidates cause divisions to different degrees.
When there is initially
M AB
N BA
and C is added there obviously can be
M CAB or
M ACB or
M BAC
and
N CBA or
N BCA or
N BAC
Both M and N may obviously be divided among the added C variations (with
possible very different AC, CA and BC, CB numbers).
Thus it should come as no surprise that there may be some apparently strange
results in a confused and irrational voters case with a small number of
voters (as in a 2-3-4 voters case or for that matter ANY V-1, V, V+1 voters
case).