Mr. Ossipoff wrote- I have no idea what Prof. Coombs said about unranked alternatives. I'd guess that, most likely, he didn't say anything about it, since the academic assumption has always been that everyone ranks all of the alternatives. Just as Condorcet probably didn't say anything about that question. In both methods, I define them in the way that actually works. Similarly, that's why I define Condorcet's method in terms of votes-against, though Condorcet, as I understand it, didn't specify how defeats should be measured. ---- D- Thus, since Mr. Condorcet is no longer alive to comment about unranked alternatives, should Condorcet on this list be actually Condorcet-Ossipoff ? Since there are other possible tie breakers in the head to head matrix of all candidates when there is no single head to head winner in all of his/her pairings (such as total votes for, total votes against, total votes for minus total votes against, etc.), there can also be Condorcet-Eppley, Condorcet-Lanphier, Condorcet-Demorep, Condorcet-Davidson (?), etc., etc. Again, I note that Mr. Arrow says that any election method (with its tie breaker) has strategy problems. Which tie breaker will make the most sense to the public (who will be asked in the States to vote on constitutional amendments for single and/or multiple winner election reforms for executive and judicial offices) ?
