> >Hi-- > >Your argument is convincing--why vote for something lesser, when >you can vote for the real thing. > >It's said that it's better to vote for what you want and not >get it than to vote for what you don't want and get it. I >quite agree. I won't be voting for a corrupt lesser-evil in >November. I'll probably vote for Nader instead of Cthulhu, though, >because he has better name recognition, and because I like his >policy positions better. > >But I suggest a simple solution for the person who wants to vote >for a lesser-evil and won't even consider otherwise: > >Simply let the voter mark more than 1 name on the ballot if s/he >so wishes, voting for as many candidates as s/he wants to, and >giving one whole vote to each candidate whom s/he votes for. > >As with our current 1-vote Plurality system, the candidate with >the most votes wins. This system that lets people vote for more >than 1 is called the Approval method. > >Approval gets rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem (we abbreviate >it LO2E) because, with Approval, for the first time, everyone >would be able to vote for their favorite. If someone feels a >need to vote for a lesser-evil like Al Gore, they can also vote >for everyone whom they like better, including Nader. > >Maybe you've heard proposals for rank-balloting voting systems. >It turns out that only a very few of the very best rank methods >are as good as the elegantly simple Approval method. Besides, >unlike the rank methods, Approval is a _minimal_ change from our >current voting system, making it very easy to propose, define, >& justify. Approval has a stability that no other voting system >has. Uniquely stable, and elegantly simple. > >Here are a few criteria that Approval meets: > >Favorite-Betrayal Criterion (FBS): > >By voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite, a voter >should never gain an outcome that s/he likes better than any >outcome that s/he could get without voting a less-liked candidate >over his/her favorite. > >*** > >In other words, no one has any incentive to dump their favorite. >More important, no one is strategically forced to dump their >favorite, as they are now, when they dump Nader to vote for >lesser-evil Gore. (Isn't "Gore" a neat name for a lesser-evil") > >*** > >Strong Adverse Results Criterion (SARC): > >If a group of voters all have the same preferences, and all >vote in the same way, and if they vote in a way that, with some >configuration of the other people's votes, could gain an outcome >that they like better than all the outcomes that they could get >by other ways of voting, then the fact that they showed up & >voted in that way should never cause their 1st choice to lose, >or cause their last choice to win. > >*** > >FBC & SARC may sound obvious, but only Approval meets those >2 criteria. Approval is the only method that meets FBC, and >Approval is the only method that meets SARC. > >*** > >Non-Drastic Defense Criterion (NDDC): > >If a majority of all the voters prefer A to B, then they should >have a way of voting that ensures that B can't win, without any >member of that majority voting a less-liked candidate over a >more-liked one. > >*** > >Approval meets NDDC. Only a few of the best methods meet NDDC. > >*** > >Let me introduce UUCC: > >With out Plurality method, there could be a good-old-boy, a >longtime corrupt incumbant, or a party consisting of those types. >Maybe this guy is someone who has traditionally been the >coming-together point for the progressives for a long time. >Say there's another newer candidate who share's the corrupt >candidate's policy position, but isn't corrupt. > >If you're one of just a few people who switch to the new candidate, >you could cause Mr. Corrupt to lose to some other party whose >policy positions are worse (and which is also corrupt). Does >that sound familiar? The result is that the electorate could >be stuck re-electing a corrupt party or incumbant because everyone >is afraid to change their vote and risk the election of someone >worse. This is the lesser-of-2-evils problem with a vengeance: >Even if everyone prefers the new candidate to Mr. Corrupt, >Mr. Corrupt can keep winning. > >Here's a criterion about that: > >Unanimously-Unpreferred Candidate Criterion (UUCC): > >If everyone prefers X to Xc, then it shouldn't be possible to >contrive a situation where Xc wins, and where if 1 voter changed >his vote so as to no longer vote Xc over X, that could cause >the election of someone whom that voter likes better than Xc. > >*** > >Approval is one of the few methods that meet UUCC. Plurality >fails it, for instance. > >*** > >Some promoters in the U.S., known as the IRVies, are aggressively >pushing a method that they call "Instant Runoff", or "Instant >Runoff Voting" (IRV). IRV fails every one of the criteria that >I've listed here, and meets no important criteria. > >*** > >Let me know of any questions, comments, agreements, disagreements, >or other reactions to all this. > >*** > >Mike Ossipoff >[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > ________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com