Recent postings by a prolific exponent of Condorcet may have overstated both the existence of, and the necessity for, unanimity with respect to the importance of certain underlying standards among those who prefer Smith//Condorcet to IRO. If IRO is politically the principal alternative to Smith//Condorcet, then perhaps S//C supporters should not put undue emphasis on certain standards that are not essential to the comparison of those two systems, particularly if those standards are not accepted as intuitively obvious by all electoral reformers, or are questioned by rigorous academics such as Bruce Anderson. In order to conclude that Smith//Condorcet is preferable to IRO, I do not think it is necessary that one (a) believe that the "Majority Rule" or "LO2E" standards, as stated on this list, are important, (b) understand why the proponents of those standards assert that they implement the concepts expressed in their titles, or (c) understand how Smith//Condorcet may be considered a "direct restatement" of those standards. I have voted for Smith//Condorcet over IRO not because of those standards, but for two basic reasons: (1) IRO will elect candidate A, who would lose a head-to-head race with candidate B, in plausible circumstances where S//C elects B, the candidate who would defeat any candidate head-to-head. (2) IRO creates incentives to vote for less-favored candidates over more favored candidates under broader ranges of circumstances than S//C, and under plausible conditions may even reward strategies that involve a portion of the backers of a plurality candidate voting for their last choice first. I think that to prefer S//C over IRO one need only believe that the result of IRO in (1) above is undemocratic, or that it is important to minimize the likelihood that voters' ballots reflect tactical choices rather than their true opinions of the candidates. Would the major spokespersons for Condorcet on this list agree? -- Hugh Tobin