Mr. Eppley wrote: But it would be nice if he [Demorep1] would explain WHY he thinks B's disapproval is more important to the voters than the fact that a majority prefer B more than A. --- D writes: I wrote earlier but repeat- a relative vote (B > A) based on an absolute disapproval of the candidate (B is unacceptable to be elected) is a fraudulent vote (and gives any such B candidate who might otherwise be the relative winner a false sense of public approval). ---- Mr. Eppley wrote: The question involves a circular tie between A, B, and NOTA: A > NOTA > B > A Why should NOTA be treated differently than a normal choice in a circular tie? --- D writes: A vote for NOTA (none of the above) (if it is going to be on ballots) is a special case and is an absolute vote, not a relative vote. That is, if a majority of the voters vote NOTA, NOTA wins (i.e. NOTA goes to the head of a voter's ballot and the majority's combined ballots making NOTA a de facto NOTB (none of the below)). I would suggest not having NOTA on the ballot-- i.e. require a voter to approve or disapprove each candidate individually. A reasonable ballot access requirement, (such as 0.5 percent of the votes cast at the last election for the office) combined with a majority approval or disapproval vote (especially the latter) will eliminate the extremists for executive and judicial offices. I repeat- leftwing and rightwing extremists can run for a p.r. legislative body and expound their views as in sundry European p.r. elections.