29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB4A@ADD-EX1">Two questions arise from absolute SUs. How do you get inside another voter'sThe reason I use absolute SU calculations is because absolute utility is
what is actually important. It is important to note that absolute can
diverge significantly from weighted utilities. I am suspicious of the
assumption that it will all even out in the end. I strongly suspect that
some factions of voters are much more likely to have a particular pattern of
utilities than others. What I mean for example is that Candidate C's
supporters (voting C,B,A,D), on the whole, might have very low expected
utilities (average 5,3,1,0) while Candidate D's supporters (voting D,A,B,C)
have very high expected utilities (99,95,94,92). It isn't unreasonable to
suggest that factions who vote in different ways have very different actual
utility patterns and values.
This is, of course, not a very useful concept, because it makes discussions
like which voti! ng method is best for social utility not very productive.
>From the sense of reported absolute utilities, it is very difficult to be
able to measure your own utilities against the utilities of others, if not
epistemologically impossible.
head to determine how strongly he/she really feels? And if absolute SUs (ASUs)
really are meaningful, how can they be made a policy goal without actually
requiring that some voters carry more weight than others?
ASU assumes all costs and benefits are tangible. As soon as intangibles come
into play, ASU is a myth, because you can never determine whose intangible
needs are more important. Social choices involving only tangible elements
tend to be zero-sum games (exceptions occur if one or more alternatives
is wasteful: "How should we invest this huge pile of cash -- stocks, bonds,
or lottery tickets?"). So if ASU is valid, we are dealing with only tangible
payoffs and are probably in a zero-sum game. What good is ASU if it is
is the same for every outcome?29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB4A@ADD-EX1">29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB4A@ADD-EX1">Normalized SUs do not open the philosophical can of worms that absoluteAs normalised utilities are simply distorted absolute utilities, that are
increasingly separated from the goal of utility maximisation, it doesn't
make sense to say that one should pay attention to normalised utilities, but
not the real utilities they were derived from. If the goal is utility
maximisation, you have to accept that the ultimate goal is absolute utility
maximisation. If you can't accept this, then you should not support a
method on the basis of SU maximisation (I note that Richard didn't claim to
support Approval solely on SU maximisation).
Qualification: I don't totally disregard SU arguments, I'm just pointing out
the problems.
SUs do. I agree that SU is a lousy policy goal because it cannot be reliably
measured, but ASU is worse than normalized SU.
However, normalized SUs are useful in theoretical work because they
assume all voters should have an equal opportunity to express their
preferences, as do the methods we are considering. If we are going to
discuss SU when evaluating methods, let us at least avoid the mythical
absolute SU.
>From an applied standpoint, I judge these methods based on what set of
constraints I, as a voter, would accept. I find Approval's constraints
the most acceptable because I can decide which of my preferences
is the most important one, and draw the line there. In ranked methods
I cannot emphasize one preference over another. Of course, some of
the hybrid methods such as Dyadic Approval and now Approval
Completed Condorcet are showing us how the constraints can be
relaxed without throwing that away. I hesitate to fully endorse those
methods until I understand how they impact voter strategy.
Richard
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