I just figured out a ranked method that sort of satisfies strong FBC: Any positional method that assigns equal points to your first and second choices satisfies Strong FBC. By positional method I mean any method that assigns points to candidates based on rankings, and the candidate with the most points wins.
Plurality is a positional method that gives 1 point to your favorite and zero to all others. Borda gives zero to your bottom choice, 1 to your second-last, 2 to the next higher choice, etc. So, a method that assigns one point each to your favorite and second favorites and zero to all lower choices in races with 3+ candidates (and is defined to be plurality in 2-way races) will satisfy strong FBC. This isn't a very satisfying answer on strong FBC, since it essentially treats your first and second choices equally. However, formally it is a ranked method that satisfies strong FBC. If you want something more satisfying, I can think of two paths. 1) Define "Stronger FBC": Regular FBC with the added condition that "There will exist situations in which a different result is obtained if all voters interchange their first and second choices." A method that gives 1 point each to your first and second choices, and zero to all others, does not satisfy this. 2) Ask if strong FBC is compatible with the majority criterion: If a candidate is the first choice of a majority of the voters then he will win. That's all for now, folks. I don't know that I want to continue on this quest. Alex ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em