On 2003-01-23, Markus Schulze uttered to [EMAIL PROTECTED]: >here is a paper on Nanson's method: [...]
One passage in the text sort of woke me up. There is a brief mention that Nanson at one point advocated a system where parliamentary votes are weighted by the size of each representative's constituency. The scheme is dismissed as giving rise to perverse incentives. Has such a system been considered on-list? Are any online analysis of such a thing available? The reason I'm interested is that, when I was first introduced to splintering and the accompanying strategy, my first solution was to use a weighted electorate. Later I thought combining it with IRV/STV would be a good idea. Now I've become a fan of Condorcet, but I no longer see how weighting might fit in. The idea still fascinates me, beecause with a fixed number of representatives and disciplined party voting, most of the seats in a parliament seem sort of wasted -- each party will vote uniformly, so PR reduces to weighting parties' votes by headcount. More than one seat simply means a higher weight for any vote a party casts. OTOH, if there was just one representative per party with a higher weight, most parties which are currently rounded out in the election (that is, do not get even a single seat) would still be present in the parliament, albeit with a very low weight. Alternatively we might be able to do with a smaller parliament. To me, both ideas seem appealing. -- Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], tel:+358-50-5756111 student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front openpgp: 050985C2/025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2 ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em