Warren, --- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > now available at > > http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/FBCsurvey.html
The "MDD" process is inherently incompatible with clone independence. No matter what you do after MDD, it's possible that cloning the winner, such that there's a majority-strength cycle among the clones, will cause the win to necessarily move to some other candidate. >Perhaps also other voting methods may be converted to be FBC- >compliant by using Venzke's "tied at the top trick." (I am not >quite sure when this works.) I can think of two very different ways. In ICA, which seeks to disqualify candidates with pairwise losses, it is never beneficial to {a,b} for there to be a pairwise win for one over the other. The "tied at the top" interpretation makes it so that you need not strictly rank A over B (or vice versa) to eliminate a win between them. It's always at least as effective to rank them equally. For another way, consider a (rather bad) method which elects the candidate with the greatest number of rankings over some other candidate. (That is, if the matrix has no value greater than v[x,y], elect X.) By itself, this method doesn't satisfy FBC because it could be that introducing a strict ranking between X and Y could cause v[x,y] to be the greatest win and move the win to X from some other candidate. But we can use the "tied at the top" rule to fix this. Just say that when X and Y are "tied at the top" on a given ballot, this vote counts to both v[x,y] and v[y,x]. Then all that can be "gained" by introducing a strict X>Y ranking is that v[y,x] is reduced. These applications are kind of opposites. ICA uses the trick to delete pairwise wins. This latter method uses the trick to beef up the maximum scores of each tied candidate against the other, which is harmless since a high score doesn't hurt the pairwise loser. Kevin Venzke ___________________________________________________________________________ Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo! Messenger Téléchargez cette version sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info