On 11/22/05, Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
If all you're looking for is something better than IRV that can be
boiled down to a single score, you're better off going with Approval or
Range.  My sense is that by insisting on shoehorning a Condorcet winner
method into a single score, you're treating the Condorcet winner
criterion as an absolute priority, while ignoring all of the others.
There are good reasons to believe that the other criteria are at least
as important as the Condorcet winner criterion.

Hi Rob,

I'm not really all that set on the Condorcet criterion.  However, I do *much* prefer ranked systems than those employed by range or approval.  The advantage of ranked is that it is easy to explain to people what to do, completely independent of strategy.  Just put them in order of preference.  With approval, it is very ambiguous whether to approve or not approve a non-favorite candidate, as that is all strategy.  I think preferences are by nature relative, but approval implies they are absolute.  Range has similar issues. I wouldn't know what valus to give the various candidates, and I would find that frustrating (and expect that those with less knowledge of the process would as well, likely more so).

I also have problems with approval in that, whether or not it is true, it *feels* like someone who is approving more candidates than another voter is having more say. I think people have a problem with that, and will never accept it for that reason.

Obviously, I'm a lot more into the psychology of it all than most people here.  I hate the word marketing, because I tend not to be a fan of marketing people, but still....having a system that is comfortable to regular people counts for a lot, and I think existing systems (other than plurality, sadly) fail miserably on this.

Regarding your comment about "shoehorning" scores onto condorcet:  since MinMax *is* condorcet, and does produce scores....that isn't really shoehorning, is it?

Is MinMax really that bad?  You said yourself that not having a Condorcet winner is rare, so, that being the case, it seems that in most cases MinMax is just as good as other Condorcet methods.  My guess is that even rarer is the case where the MinMax winner would differ from the Beatpath winner.

You mentioned priorities, here are my main priorites (none of which is "meeting the Condorcet criterion"):

1) Reducing or eliminating the strategic advantage that clustering into two parties gives (due to vote splitting).  I think this is the most destructive force in US politics, resulting in a polarized government that spends a ridiculous amount of effort trying to "bring down the other side", rather than actually running the government and solving real problems.

2) having a user interface to voting that is something that people can easily use, and that gives the voter the feeling that they expressed their true preferences, and that doing so did not compromise their interests.

3) having results that the public can easily view and feel that they understand the main gist of what happened.  (this also applies to pre-election polling results)

4) having no strategic advantage to voting late, after you have seen how others have voted.  This could allow real elections (as opposed to just things like web based polls) to happen over a longer period of time than a single day, which could make them far less costly and far more convenient to voters.

5) having the tabulation method easily explainable to average people who are not necessarily great at math and logic.

Reasons 2, 3 and 5 have to do as much with marketing as anything.  I think if you can get people to understand the system (and to understand the results of elections carried out using the system), you are more likely to get the system put into place for real government elections.

Reason #1, however, is the main reason I care about all this.  My gut feeling is -- and feel free to dispute this if you disagree -- that a minmax system would address the destructive partisanship in government pretty much as well as something like beatpath.

-rob
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