At 08:49 PM 12/8/2005, Scott Ritchie wrote: >Here's an example where it will never resolve: > >Voter 1: >A: 100 >B: 40 >C: 0 > >Voter 2: >A: 45 >B: 0 >C: 100 > >Voter 3: >A: 0 >B: 100 >C: 60 > >A simple Condorcet cycle.
Three voters, each with a different first place preference among three candidates. In FPTP, this is a three-way tie. No Condorcet winner. Range, interestingly enough, does produce a winner, and I'd suggest that -- in such an artificially weird election -- the Range winner is probably the best that can be chosen from among the three. Range totals A:145 B:145 C:160 Looking at why C wins, it is because C was rated higher by a B voter. Given the ratings, C *is* the best winner. It has been alleged that Range is not good if voters exaggerate. However, suppose that these voters are exaggerating. They can't exaggerate any more in the minimum and maximum ratings: normalization would make no difference in this election. The only question is how to rate the middle candidate. And it seems intuitively obvious to me that the optimum rating is the expected utility of that candidate's election, compared to the min and max candidates. How, exactly, do you "exaggerate" the middle? If you exaggerate minimum, you could cause the middle candidate to lose to your least favorite. And if you exaggerate maximum, you are failing to indicate your preference for your favorite. Range is a system that works with sincere voters, and that, in fact, appears to me to punish insincere voters: insincerity risks having contributed to an undesirable outcome. Readers may know that I'm not a fan of elections at all, I prefer non-electoral representation, i.e., proxy or delegable proxy. However, I still support polling prior to decision-making with respect to office-holders, and Range seems to me to be a very good method for that. Further, there is the interim. In that interim, which might be a very long time, we will still have elections. Strategically, I'd prefer to promote Approval, for various reasons, but Approval Plus may be politically possible (Approval plus an indication of favorite: if used to determine the winner, it's a truncated Condorcet method with three ranks: Favorite, Approved, and Disapproved; if not used to determine the winner, it is used for informational purposes and public campaign financing). And Range is a refinement of Approval; but it takes a more complex ballot. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info