I have doubts about how "serious" the strategic burying problem really is. Most discussions I've seen on this list (and I'll admit that I haven't always read them very carefully) seem to greatly oversimplify the strategy problem by assuming that the major strategic concern of voters is to help their favorite win. But in fact, voters are often even more concerned about preventing a "greater evil" candidate from winning. Furthermore, if there are more than 3 or 4 candidates, many voters will have a whole array of concerns they will attempt to satisfy with their strategic calculations -- e.g.:
1. "I would really like A to win" 2. "I would really hate for B to win" 3. "I don't much like C either, but she's not as bad as B" 4. "D isn't nearly as good as A but much better than either B or C. 5. "I have mixed feelings about E, some good, some bad. He might turn out nearly as good as A or nearly as bad as C. etc. So my questions are, given the many different possible numbers and varieties of candidates in different elections, combined with the varying concerns different voters will have about different candidates, how often are voters likely to use a burying strategy, and how easy will it usually be -- even for voters who really excel at strategic thinking (undoubtedly a very small percentage) -- to decide that burying is a good strategy and how deep a particular candidate should be buried? In short, how big a factor is strategic burying ever really likely to be? Are there are simple, widely accepted answers to these questions that I've missed because I haven't been paying enough attention to the posts on this list? If so, I'll be happy to apologize after being set straight on this. -Ralph Suter In a message dated 3/15/06 3:22:59 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << JG-A does an evenhanded job of balancing CVD's rather tendentiously pro-IRV piece, without ignoring the serious problem that Condorcet methods have with strategic "burying". Recommended, along with the linked piece that tries to address this problem (with, I'd say, mixed success). We can all agree that if 1) all voters sincerely rank their preferences, and 2) those rankings result in a Condorcet winner, that the Condorcet winner should be elected. Suter acknowledges (2) but entirely ignores (1). >> ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info