On 3/12/06, radio deli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Dear Jan, > > I saw your post on the Elections Methods List. As a Vermont legislator, we > may have to decide the issue of IRV on a statewide basis.
Welcome, Jim! Thank you for taking an interest in voting reform, and in what this group has to say about it. > To be honest, I'm > not very enthusiastic about IRV. I would prefer to support the candidate > (not plural) of my choice, and if a runoff must occur between candidates I > didn't support, then make a new decision based on the contest at hand. > > What are the problems you see with IRV? Could you explain them in a way > that people without a statistics degree (like me) could comprehend? I hope > you have a chance to respond---you seem quite knowledgeable on the topic! Let me summarize what I think your main choices are, and my personal recommendations, and then get into details. I. Do nothing. Keep the system you have now. (We call it "Plurality voting", or sometimes First Past the Post, FPTP.) II. Adopt Plurality with a separate runoff round if no candidate gets a majority of votes in the first round. III. Adopt IRV. IV. Adopt some other voting method. My recommendations: I. (Do nothing, keep Plurality.) Obviously the easiest choice, but I don't recommend it. Plurality voting has some serious problems. If you aren't familiar with them, I recommend reading the first section ("Problems with Plurality Voting") of my "Better Voting Methods" article at www.votebuddy.org/votemeth.htm . II. (Adopt Plurality with runoff.) I think this is a BAD idea. It can be expensive, and is somewhat dangerous, in that it can sometimes elect widely disliked candidates. I discuss this in detail below. III. (Adopt IRV.) This is my second-best recommendation. I present some pros and cons of IRV below. IV. (Adopt some other method.) This is my best recommendation. Here are three methods that are practical and popular with many of the people on the election-methods list: * Approval Voting. This is the simplest possible reform, and it is a vast improvement over Plurality voting. Simply remove the no-overvoting rule from the present voting rules, and allow people to vote for as many candidates for an office as they wish. Voters who are happy with the Democratic or Republican candidate will usually just vote for that one candidate, but a Green voter, for example, might vote for both the Green and the Democrat. This method can be handled by any existing voting equipment - no upgrades needed. For more info, visit www.ApprovalVoting.com and www.ApprovalVoting.org . * Range or Score Voting. Voters assign a score (in a range of, say, 0 to 10) to each candidate. The candidate who gets the highest average score wins. This method can also be handled by any existing voting equipment. For more info, see math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/RangeVoting.html . * Condorcet or Instant Round Robin Voting. Voters indicate their 1st choice candidate, 2nd choice, etc. using the same kind of ballots as IRV. However, the counting is different. Candidates are compared, a pair at a time, to see which candidate is preferred over the other in each pair. If there is a candidate who beats all the other candidates in the pairwise comparisons (a "beats-all" candidate, more formally known as a Condorcet Winner, CW), then that candidate wins. Washington state representative Toby Nixon is leading an effort to adopt this method in Washington. For more info, see http://groups.yahoo.com/group/condorcet/ . V. I assume that you (Jim) are mainly interested in possible voting reform in Vermont state-controlled general elections. But, _please_ also give some thought to voting reform within your party. The types of voting methods you use in your candidate selection process affect the quality of the candidates that are eventually nominated. Candidates are often chosen by straight Plurality voting, or by Plurality with runoffs. As I show in the first section below, this can sometimes lead to "fanatical" or special-interest candidates being chosen as the winner. These are candidates who have enthusiastic support of a substantial minority of the party members, but are strongly disliked or hated by a majority. I invite you to consider whether some of our past presidential candidates may have been fanatical or special-interest candidates, who were selected by Plurality-based elections. I suggest that it would be in the best interests of each individual party, as well as in the interest of the entire country, to implement better voting methods in parties' candidate selection processes! Range Voting and Approval Voting tend to choose as winners candidates who have a broad base of support. A party that uses such a better voting methods would be able to choose candidates that enjoy broader popularity both within and outside the party. Those candidates could raise more money and support from within the party, and attract more votes from outside the party. I'd appreciate it, Jim, if you could spread this idea around within your party: IT IS IN YOUR PARTY'S BEST INTEREST to use the best possible voting methods for choosing your candidates. Ok, here are more details about topics mentioned above: *** PLURALITY VOTING WITH RUNOFF *** There are several ways to implement plurality voting with runoff, but the simplest and most usual way to do that in general elections is to hold a runoff between the top two vote-getters, if no one got a majority of the votes in the first ballot. There are two main problems with this voting method: 1. It's hard to say how often a runoff would be needed - maybe 10% of elections would need a runoff? - but when it happens, it is a hassle for everyone. The candidates have probably spent their last dimes campaigning to try to win the first round. The election department has to come up with more money to hold the runoff election. The candidates are exhausted. The voters are exhausted. The turnout for runoff elections is usually much lower than for the main election. 2. When there are several candidates of roughly equal strength in a Plurality election, some of the top vote-getters can be "fanatical" or special-interest candidates. Those candidates are the first choice of a significant fraction of the voters, but are hated by the rest of the voters. Meanwhile, many of the other candidates may be reasonable, moderate, and acceptable to a majority of the voters, but because there are several of them, they "split the vote" of the majority of voters, so each candidate gets only a small fraction of the votes. The result is that the fanatical candidates can rise to the top, and advance to the runoff election (or win immediately, if there is no runoff). Some examples where this actually happened are: - The 2002 French presidential election, where the anti-Semitic Jean-Marie Le Pen advanced to the runoff to face the unpopular incumbent president Jacques Chirac. (Look up "Le Pen" and follow the related links at wikipedia.org for more details.) - The 1991 Louisiana gubernatorial open primary, where former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke advanced to the runoff to face the corrupt former governor Edwin Edwards (who is now serving 10 years in prison for racketeering!). (Look up "David Duke" at wikipedia.org for more details.) The Republican party took extraordinary measures to prevent a "fanatical candidate" (as defined above) from advancing to a runoff in this example: The 1990 Louisiana state senate race open primary involved David Duke running as a Republican (without the party's endorsement), the Republican-endorsed Ben Bagert, and the Democrat J. Bennett Johnson. Duke was polling 30 to 40% but was not expected to get more than 40% if he advanced to a runoff. Bagert was polling a distant third. Rather than face the embarrassment of having Duke representing the Republicans in a runoff election against Johnson, the Republican Party withdrew funding of Bagert's campaign. This forced Bagert to quit the race, and allowed Johnson to get a majority of votes in the primary election. Thus, Johnson won the senate race without need for a runoff in the November general election. ("Louisiana Republican Quits, Reducing Duke's Chances", Washington Post, October 5, 1990, page A1) Note that all of these races were Plurality with top-two runoff. Plurality with runoff lulls voters into a false sense of security. Voters tend to believe that they can freely vote for their true favorite candidate, and if a runoff occurs, they will have the pleasure of choosing between two good candidates (the two "most popular"). But, the argument and examples above show that sometimes one or both of the candidates advancing to the runoff can be unpalatable to a majority of the voters. *** PROBLEMS WITH IRV *** To be fair, perhaps I should first mention a few _good_ things about IRV: 1. It is "instant", meaning that voters need to vote only once. No separate runoff is necessary. (Most other methods discussed on this list are "instant" also, regardless of whether it says so in the name of the method.) 2. IRV (and most other methods) allow voters to express an opinion about more than one candidate, if they wish. With Plurality voting, you can only vote for one candidate - that's it! Some people (apparently including you, Jim) don't _want_ to vote for or provide preference information about more than one candidate. That's fine... you don't have to. In IRV (and most other methods), you can just mark your first choice and be done with it. But some people do appreciate the opportunity to indicate their opinions of more than one candidate. 3. IRV _alleviates_ most of the problems with Plurality voting. Personally, I would rather vote with IRV than with Plurality in important elections. However, I think there are _many_ methods that are much better than IRV in a number of ways. 4. Since IRV (as it is usually described and implemented) allows for potentially several runoffs, IRV is much less likely to choose a fanatical or special-interest candidate as winner, compared with Plurality with top-two runoff discussed above. For example, if IRV had been used in the 2002 French presidential election, the winner would probably have been Lionel Jospin. Jospin was a relatively moderate, well-respected candidate, the incumbent prime minister. He came in a close third place in the first round election, less than 0.7% behind Le Pen, and well ahead of the fourth-place candidate. (An important side note: I looked at Vermont's IRV bill several years ago, and as far as I could tell, it specified a non-standard form of IRV. If no candidate got a majority of the first-choice votes, then all but the top two vote-getters would be immediately eliminated and their ballots would be redistributed to the top two vote-getters. This form of IRV would generally produce the same results as Plurality with top-two runoff. Please, Jim, if Vermont enacts IRV, make sure that candidates are (effectively) eliminated one at a time, NOT all but the top two at once. That will reduce the danger of having a fanatical candidate win.) OK, so what are some problems with IRV? 1. IRV can elect what might informally be called a "wrong winner". By that, I mean that there may be another candidate (called the Condorcet winner, CW, or "beats-all" winner) who could beat every other candidate (including the IRV winner) in one-on-one contests. Here is an example: 41 Left>Middle 10 Middle>Left 10 Middle>Right 39 Right>Middle (That means: 41 voters voted for Left as 1st choice, and Middle as 2nd choice. 10 voters voted for Middle as 1st choice and Left as 2nd choice. Etc. "Left", "Middle" and "Right" are just names I've chosen to the candidates, to hint at how they might be positioned on an ideological spectrum. I could have used "A", "B" and "C", or "Green", "Democrat", "Republican", etc.) How does IRV choose the winner in this election? Well, Middle has the fewest first-choice votes - he was listed as first choice on 20 ballots. So Middle is eliminated, and his ballots are redistributed to the next choices shown on those ballots. The result is that Left has 51 ballots in her pile, and Right has 49 ballots. Left has a majority of the ballots, and Left wins. "So, what's wrong with that?" you may ask. Let's look at the preferences of the voters, as expressed in the ballots. 20 voters indicated they like Middle best. 39 voters prefer Middle over Left. So there are 20+39=59 voters who prefer Middle over Left, and only 41 voters who prefer Left over Middle. If Right had not entered the race, we might reasonably expect that Middle would beat Left, 59 to 41. (Note that voters also prefer Middle over Right, 61 to 39. So Middle is the "beats-all" winner.) So, who should win that race, Left or Middle? Some IRV advocates would argue for Left. Personally, I would prefer Middle (the beats-all winner). One argument that IRV supporters might use to justify Left as winner, is that Left has stronger 1st-choice support. My reply: 1. If 1st-choice support is the golden standard, why bother with IRV? Plurality is _guaranteed_ to choose the candidate with the most 1st-choice support! 2. 1st-choice support is actually not a very good standard at all. There is a danger that a fanatical or special-interest candidate could end up with a plurality of votes and win. Another argument justifying Left as winner is that Left is the "majority winner" or is "supported by the majority". (This argument is usually used as a slogan to sell IRV to the general public. I wouldn't expect to hear it in a debate with advocates of other voting methods.) My reply: 1. The "majority" that IRV advocates refer to is contrived. The IRV winner is the candidate who ends up with a majority of the ballots. But is it fair to say that all the voters whose ballots were transferred to Left actually "support" Left? (For example, if the 2004 presidential election had been held using IRV, many people might have voted Cobb>Nader>Kerry. Most of Cobb's and Nader's ballots would have ended up on Kerry's pile. But would the people who voted Cobb>Nader>Kerry or Nader>Cobb>Kerry agree that they "supported" Kerry? I think some would disagree!) 2. There are lots of ways to count the ballots, measure the "support" for various candidates, and claim that a candidate has a "majority of support". I happen to find the type of "majority support" enjoyed by a beats-all winner to be particularly convincing. After all, the beats-all winner is preferred by a majority of voters over EVERY other candidate! I'll show one more example to show how IRV can choose a "wrong winner", and then move on to some other problems with IRV. 17 FarLeft>Left>Middle 18 Left>Middle 32 Middle 17 Right>Middle 16 FarRight>Right>Middle Middle seems like the logical choice to win, right? But, let's see who IRV chooses as winner... FarRight is listed as 1st choice on the fewest ballots. So FarRight is eliminated, all of FarRight's ballots go to Right, and Right ends up with 16+17=33 ballots. Now FarLeft (among the surviving candidates) has the fewest ballots in his pile. So FarLeft is eliminated, all of FarLeft's ballots are transferred to Left, and Left ends up with 17+18=35 ballots. And now - surprise! - Middle has the fewest ballots in her pile, so Middle is eliminated. The Middle-first voters were apparently so confident Middle would win that they didn't bother to indicate second choices :-) So those ballots are "exhausted"; they are ignored for the remainder of the IRV counting. In the final round, Left has 35 ballots in his pile, Right has 33, so Left wins. In this example, Middle is the beats-all winner. Looking at the ballots, we see that voters prefer Middle over Left, 65 to 35. They prefer Middle over Right, 67 to 33. Middle is preferred over FarLeft and FarRight by even larger margins. Both of the above examples illustrate a problem with IRV called the "center squeeze" effect. A centrist candidate can be "squeezed out" by candidates on either side, even though the centrist candidate may be preferred by a majority of voters to all other candidates. 2. Another problem with IRV is that it can encourage strategic voting, contrary to the claims of some IRV supporters. Let's reuse the first example to illustrate this. Suppose voters vote their true preferences, as follows: 41 Left>Middle 10 Middle>Left 10 Middle>Right 39 Right>Middle Left wins, according to IRV. That is the worst possible outcome, from the point of view of the Right>Middle voters. Can the Right>Middle voters vote some other way, to get a better outcome? Yes. If at least 10 of the Right>Middle voters vote Middle>Right instead, then the ballots will look like this: 41 Left>Middle 10 Middle>Left 20 Middle>Right 29 Right>Middle In this case, Right is eliminated, the ballots go to Middle, and Middle wins with 59 ballots. From the viewpoint of the Right>Middle voters, "Middle wins" is a better outcome than "Left wins". Thus, if polls show that people are expected to vote as in the first case (with 39 Right>Middle votes), then there will be an incentive for the Right>Middle voters to vote Middle>Right instead; the Right>Middle voters will feel a pressure to change their votes. "What's wrong with that?" you may be wondering. "Some voters can get a better outcome by voting strategically, rather than sincerely. If they do that, the beats-all candidate wins, which Jan was saying is a better outcome than having IRV choose a 'wrong winner'. So where is the problem??" My replies: a) In situations such as the above, IRV pressures some voters to lie about their preferences, and to "betray their favorite" candidate by voting some other candidate higher than their favorite. It puts the voters into an uncomfortable spot. Put yourself in the shoes of the Right>Middle voters in the above axample. Would you vote Right>Middle, and risk having your worst nightmare (Left) win? Or would you betray your favorite candidate (Right) by voting Middle>Right, in order to try to help Middle win? b) When voters succumb to the pressure to vote strategically, the voting results are not an accurate indication of voters' true preferences. Look at the last example above, where it shows 29 Right>Middle. How could anyone tell that there are really 39 voters who prefer Right>Middle? Those inaccuracies can cause politicians and political analysts to misestimate the amount of support for certain positions, if they base their estimates on election results. Also, if public campaign funds are distributed in proportion to 1st-choice votes, then the inaccuracy of the vote results causes the funds to be distributed unfairly. (Note: I do NOT support the idea of public campaign financing! Don't spend my tax money on candidates I don't like. Let me spend my own money as I see fit!) 3) IRV _may_ require expensive upgrades to existing voting equipment and software. It depends on what equipment you have currently. I expect it takes a bit longer to fill out IRV ballots than Plurality ballots, so more voting booths may be needed to keep voting lines from getting long. Finally, election staff and voters need to be educated on the new voting method. (Some of these expenses would be incurred with other voting methods as well. But Approval and Range Voting don't need hardware or software upgrades.) 4) With Plurality voting, it is common practice to post, at each polling place, on the night of the election, a summary of the vote results obtained at that polling place. This allows interested citizens to compare the results reported by the polling place election judges with the results reported by the central election office, to make sure election data doesn't get lost or altered between the polling place and the election office. This practice helps assure election integrity. Unfortunately, with IRV, the elections results obtained at the polling places can't be concisely summarized, when there are more than about three or four candidates in a race Thus, it becomes impractical for ordinary citizens to verify results obtained by the polling places with the results as received by the elections office. (Approval and Range Voting elections can be concicely summarized. Condorcet is not so concisely summarizable as Approval and Range, but is better than IRV.) > Best Regards, > Rep. Jim Condon > Colchester, VT Thanks again for your interest! I hope this answer wasn't overwhelming. Please feel free to ask more questions. I would welcome any news you care to share with us about what is going on with voting reform in Vermont. Cheers, - Jan ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info