On Mon, 03 Apr 2006 20:44:45 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > At 08:16 PM 4/3/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote: > >> Looking much like Condorcet. From there we know that cycles can occur, >> needing more thought here. >
I see nothing prohibiting the following collection of lists: A>B B>C C>A These happen in Condorcet, and give us headaches as to procedure. I see nothing here justifying claims as to simplicity in counting. > > The proposal was one which uses any method allowing a ranked ballot. The > difference between it an standard plurality -- it uses the standard > plurality ballot -- is that instead of voting for a candidate, strictly, > one is voting for a list provided by a candidate. > > While it is theoretically possible for that list to not be headed by the > candidate, we may presume that it is. I.e., we may presume that any > candidate will put his or her own name at the top of the list. > > It is also possible to do this without using candidate-provided lists, > in which case it is essentially Asset Voting. But the idea here is that > candidates have provided a list, which is published, so when voters vote > for a candidate, they know where their vote goes if that candidate is > eliminated. > > It seems to have been missed by Mr. Ketchum that the voting is for a > candidate, and that each candidate provides only one list, in advance of > the election. Hence he asked: There was NOTHING in the original post restricting a candidate to a single list. A candidate can certainly know that backers disagree as to second or lower choice. > >> Starts out looking good but, how many lists might there be with half a >> dozen candidates? > > > Half a dozen. > >> What would this quantity do to the voting machine? >> How much might this confuse the voter looking for an acceptable >> list? > > > Not at all. I suppose I might, as a voter, be mildly interested in what > my favorite candidate would do with my vote, but, for me, the issue is > this: if I consider someone trustworthy enough to serve in an office, > why not consider them trustworthy to vote for someone who is also > relatively worthy of election. At this point it matters VERY LITTLE as to what you or I might do. What matters is what a collection of voters might desire - that could be useful. Especially for minor candidates that expect to lose, their backers very likely disagree as to second choices. > > This is an extremely simple ballot and process. The method by which the > lists are used would be any ranked ballot method, as if the voters had > marked the ballot with one of the provided lists. I understand that in > STV elections, parties often provide such lists anyway, and very many > voters, out of party loyalty, use them. > > This method is quite clearly superior to standard plurality and, in my > view, to IRV. It allows experts to make ranking decisions, with the > public choosing their favorite *expert*. (Candidates frequently know > other candidates, far better than does the public.) > >> > This is exactly the kind of simplicity that we need to get a viable >> improvement over plurality for public elections. > > > I agree that it is totally simple. Any complexity would be the > complexity of the exact election method chosen. However, reporting and > counting the vote would be much simpler, because the vote can be > reported just the same as plurality. It is only in the analysis that the > difference comes. And anyone can do that calculation, using the provided > lists. > >> Sounds like as much trouble as Condorcet and in counting complexity, >> though doable with present voting machines - provided they can tolerable >> the number of choices. > > > Of course, the method was misunderstood. The number of choices is the > number of candidates, same as in plurality, and the counting complexity > is actually low, since precincts can simply report the standard vote > counts, they do not have to analyze. Analysis will be no more complex > than required by the ranked election method used, and should be easier > because of the limited number of ballot types involved. > > This is a case where overvoting could create problems; however, there > might be a way to analyze overvotes that would work. But I won't get > into that here, I'm just noting that there is, with this proposal, on > the face, a reason to discard overvotes that is rational, unlike the > case with discarding them under standard plurality. Overvotes here, > unlike the case with standard plurality, would create counting > complexity even if a way is determined to use them. I'd agree with > keeping it simple. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info