At 05:52 PM 5/1/2006, Antonio Oneala wrote: >As for the other reply to my thread, I'm not a fan of asset >either. I have a feeling it will enforce party structures, as a >candidate inside of a party is far more likely to give it to another >candidate in the party than to and independent.
Sure. And a voter is more likely to vote for candidates who belong to the voter's favorite party. But the question is whether or not Asset would "enforce" such structures and strictures, or would it make it possible to move beyond them. Since Asset systems (Asset as effectively free proxy voting or Published List) give the power directly to the candidates, I strongly doubt that it will increase party power and factionalism. Rather, when a candidate has excess votes, that candidate will assign them where he or she sees will best advance his or her interests, which are a proxy for the interests of the voters who chose that candidate. If the candidate wants to increase his or her party's power, that's what will be done, I'd presume. But Asset makes it possible for candidates to run *without* party affiliation. Normally, under every other voting system, if the candidate can't make the quota, that's just plain suicide for the voters and the candidate. Voting for the candidate effectively takes the votes out of the system, making them irrelevant. But with Asset, such votes aren't lost. They will normally be recast to create winners at least friendly to the interests of the transferring candidates. What I'd see Asset as likely doing is increasing the *personal* power of candidates as distinct from parties. But at the same time, the number of active and significant candidates would likely increase greatly. > It also has the problem that a lot of systems do; it doesn't > increase the amount of voting power per each voter to accomodate > more candidates. I really don't understand this. Each voter has divisible voting power in FAAV and in the original Asset. The number of candidates does not really matter. The voter's vote is not wasted if it is cast for one candidate, whether or not that candidate ultimately gains a seat. And if the voter votes for ten, none of these fractions is lost unless the voter votes for someone who fails to transfer them. And this would be an action for which a candidate can and would be held accountable. If I voted for Bozo, I'd really want to know why Bozo let my votes die without reaching a winner! Under Asset, votes would be traceable. If a candidate transferred all of his or her votes to someone else, I'd have a very reasonable basis for considering that person *my* representative, since my vote very specifically brought that person toward the quota. Ideally, under Asset, the quota can be very precisely V/N, and each candidate ends up being elected by exactly the quota, excepting for very minor roundoff error and the few votes lost. I've suggested that seats remain vacant if no remaining candidate reaches the quota; if it is allowed to be elected without the quota, if perhaps, say, the last seat is won by the remaining candidate with a majority of the vote, this would encourage intransigence by that candidate.... > Therefore, it will lead probably lead to factionalization, or at > least cannot handle more parties than there are seats. Well, duh! Asset is *non-party* PR. Of course it can't handle more parties than seats! It doesn't handle parties at all, not as part of the system. If candidates choose to recast their votes within parties, that's allowed. But it is not required. Party affliliation is irrelevant to the method. > I've come up with a formula, where V is the amount of voting > power per a voter, and C is the amount of candidates. The formula > is, easily enough, C = V. If all voters have equal voting power, then it does not matter if they have 1 or many votes. > If the voting system keeps V stable as C increases, then > vote-splitting will result. So? Under Asset, votes are kept whole or split. It does not matter if one is splitting 10 votes or 1 vote; the only difference is that with the former the total vote -- and the quota -- are multiplied by ten. I'm not sure that the terminal simplicity of FAAV has been understood. Every voter has 1 vote, and they may divide it among as many candidates as they like. By voting for a candidate, they are assigning a fraction of their vote to the candidate, the fraction is of the form 1/N, where N is the number of votes they cast. *They have exactly what was suggested: as many "votes" as candidates.* But because all voters should be equal, no matter how many votes they cast, the votes are normalized to a *total* of one vote per voter. (In standard Approval, the votes are not divided because standard Approval is a single-winner system and the only votes that count in the end are those cast for a winner. All other votes become moot. Standard Approval effectively discards all votes cast for other than the winner. They are moot; had they not been cast, the outcome would not change. This is why standard Approval is, in fact, "one-person, one-vote," in spite of charges made by some against it.) > If it adds more C then V as C increases, then teaming will result. What will happen with Asset, certainly if it is free Asset, i.e., the original proposal, not Published List, is that candidates who do not reach the quota will negotiate with each other -- and with candidates having excess votes -- to redistribute the votes to create more winners. So minor parties can still gain a seat by essentially agreeing to share it, with a mutually acceptable winner. (I'd allow candidates to recast their votes outside the original candidate list, precisely to enable such compromises, seeking to find compromise winners mutually acceptable to "losers," who, since they recast votes to create a desired winner, are not quite losers in the same sense as today! > For instance, Plurality keeps V stable as C increases (as you > always have only one vote), approval and Condercet increase V in > proportion to C, and Borda increases V at a faster rate than > C. Asset seems to fall into the plurality situation, although it > is a bit less vulnerable. I really don't think Asset has been understood here. > However, a moderate who has 20 votes as compared to the polar > candidate thirty votes doesn't have much leeway to convince the > other guys to send votes to him, his only choice would probably be > to send his votes to the lesser of two evils. If you are running Asset for single winner, what would you expect? However, even in that case you'd really need to look at the total election results; what was stated here is not enough to even begin to understand the situation. "The polar candidate"? There would presumably be two polar candidates, in this single-winner situation. And then the moderate would be able to choose, indeed, the lesser of two evils. But what if the rules don't allow a winner without a majority of votes? And Asset would allow a far broader distribution of votes. (I wonder why there is only one moderate.... Asset would make it feasible to run for office without campaigning. Campaigns are necessary because votes are totally wasted if they don't create a winner. Once one has eliminated vote-wasting, people could simply declare candidacies and allow those who trust them to vote for them. Right now, that would be simply insanity.) But we were talking about multiwinner PR, where "moderate" does not carry the same meaning, and where the goal is to distribute representation, not to have a winner and a bunch of losers. I have yet to see any PR proposal that even approaches Asset in clear democratic function.... This is the real beauty of Asset. The voters don't have to know all the candidates; it is enough that they know and trust one. Presumably a broadly-trusted candidate will know the other candidates reasonably well. Some don't like this concentration of power, but the fact is that the concentration takes place under other systems, but it is not by the free and direct choice of the voters, it rather takes place in the halls of the parties and those who fund elections. What I'm trying to encourage, ultimately, is the concept that we can *choose* our representatives, which is quite distinct from trying to get them elected. Proxy representation is this, purely. And, beyond that, I'm trying to encourage the choosing of proxies who are personally known to the voters, who have direct communication with the voters. Which requires, in a large jurisdiction, delegable proxy, so that voters can communicate directly with their direct proxies, and the direct proxies can communicate directly with *their* direct proxies, etc. It is a phone tree generalized into an organizational structure. Fractal democracy. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info