Anthony O'Neal <thasupasacfitinman at gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Tactical voting works against that. If people tactical vote, then they > > get > > > > no method to express their actual desired. > > > > > > I don't think you understand the method. It was a very short description, > but PAV is not vulnerable to tactical voting above what normal approval is. > > Think of it like this. In a multi-winner election, you don't approve of > candidates, you approve of outcomes. In order to maintain proportionality, > however, you have to reduce peoples approval of an outcome by the St. Lague > or D'Hondt quota based on how many candidates are in the outcome that they > approve of.
Hmm, are you sure about that ? Assume that party A has 70% support and the party B has 30% support. All voters are totally polarised and are only 2 seats There are 3 candidates, A1, A2 and B1 Votes are: 70: A1: 100, A2: 100, B2: 0 30: A1: 0, A2: 0, B2: 100 Results: A1, A2: 70: 100 + 100/3 => 133*70 = 9310 30: 0 => 30*0 = 0 Total: 9310 A1, B1: 70: 100 => 100*70 = 7000 30: 100 => 100*30 = 3000 Total: 10000 A2,B2 Same as A1,B1 Total: 10000 Result each party gets one seat (option 2 or 3 wins). Now, party A decides to vote manage. They split the constituency into 2 halves. Each of the candidates only campaigns in one of the halves. Voters are told to only vote for the candidate who campaigns for their half of the constituency. Votes become 37: A1: 100, A2: 0, B1: 0 33: A1: 0, A2: 100, B1: 0 30: A1: 0, A2: 0, B1: 100 Results: A1,A2 37: 100 => 100*37 = 3700 33: 100 => 100*33 = 3300 30: 0 => 0*30 = 0 Total: 70000 A1, B1 37: 100 => 100*37 = 3700 33: 0 => 0*33 = 0 30: 100 => 100*30 = 3000 Total: 67000 A2,B2 37: 0 => 0*37 = 0 33: 100 => 100*33 = 3300 30: 100 => 100*30 = 3000 Total: 63000 Winner is option 1, A1,A2 Party A now wins 2 seats. They have benefited from vote management. >> In effect, your approval for an outcome is just the sum of your approval >> for each of the individual candidates elected. However, there is a >> limit >> to prevent any one vote from becoming to strong. > >If you reduce the strength of the vote for having multiple candidates >approved of it becomes cumulative vote, which is very vulnerable to tactical >voting. Sorry, I meant limit the total voting power. This occurs anyway under the system where there are divisors. > The approval of outcomes method is probably the only way to overcome this. > > The sequential method is vulnerable to vote management and introduces > tactical voting into it. The non-sequential method also suffers from tactical voting as I showed above (unless I made an error). >It's also more vulnerable than a computer total >simply because people can just lie about the votes their getting as they're >hand-counting them. Ok, we have a fundamental disagreement here. In a hand count there might be some small amount of fraud/error. However, to really rig an election, you need to get lots of counters involved. Also, those counters are observed. This makes it easier for there to be a small error but harder for their to be a massive error. A computer has a single point of failure (the program) and cannot be readily observed. Also, the general public doesn't really understand computers and those that do are often wary of using computers to do the tally. > For computer methods, the complexity doesn't matter. It's just as easy to > make a program that hurts candidates of one party in STV as it is in PAV and > PRV. And, actually, the only way to do STV elections without a randomness > is to use a computer. The only real alternative to using complex methods > for proportionality is a party-list, which is undesirable because it > completely takes away candidate independence You cannot do meeks method or some of the more advanced STV-PR by hand however, it is possible to do fraction STV-PR by hand (look up Gregory method). ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
