I agree with Brian Olson and RL Suter in the main point below that from the voter point of view, for methods that rely on ranked ballots this common feature looms larger than the difference in how the winner is determined once those ranked ballots have been submitted by the voters. As Steve Eppley recently pointed out there are two additional valuable features that can be used with any method that makes use of voter rankings of the candidates: (1) the candidate withdrawal option, and (2) the selection from published rankings option. The second option is just that: it doesn't preclude voters from supplying their own original rankings. It just facilitates the process for voters that happen to agree with one of the published rankings. Option (1) tends to increase the Condorcet efficiency of non-Condorcet methods like IRV, and option (2) ensures that voting is as easy or easier than in a Plurality election. [easier because there is no need to agonize over lesser evil considerations] I believe that (on the political front) we should temporarily not worry about which ranked ballot method we are pushing for, and focus on promoting (as an election method framework) the ranked ballot with the candidate withdrawal and selection from published rankings options. Once this framework is in place, we can worry about selling our favorite ranked ballot "back end." In fact, different back ends can be tried within the same framework. If IRV gets adopted within this framework, it won't be the end of the world, because its worst features will be ameliorated, and because it can be replaced with another method as a relatively minor adjustment, without bringing down the whole framework. Thanks, Forest ------------------------------
Brian Olson wrote: >Outside this list, I've been plugging "rankings and >ratings ballots" as the generic label for the issue. >I deliberately want to leave the back-end counting method >vague due to the IRV - the world feud. RL Suter responded ... That's an important point. As voting methods as opposed to counting methods, IRV and Condorcet are identical or nearly so and will be seen that way by voters. They will differ only if there are different ranking instructions, such as "you must rank all candidates" or "you may rank any two or more candidates equally." But assuming ranking instructions are identical, the only differences in the two are in how they interpret ballots after an election to determine winners. Both take information from ranked ballots and use it to simulate the results of voting methods that are too complicated and time consuming to be used in public elections. IRV simulates a series of elections in which one candidate is eliminated after each election, while Condorcet simulates an election in which voters are presented with all possible pairs of candidates and asked to choose the one in each pair they prefer more.
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