A PRELIMINARY draft paper, which attempts an exhaustive simulation of left-middle-right 3-candidate election scenarios, is http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/lcr.pdf It is only 3 pages long.
The reason it is a "preliminary" draft is, I need to recheck the computer program for bugs. It compares a lot of different voting methods. All the different Condorcet flavors all become the same method in the 3-candidate 1-dimensional case (which is all this paper considers) and similarly a lot of other method-variants also become the same, so hopefully you can't complain to me that I have not considered your favorite method, because I have. The comparison includes the recent "asset voting", and "IRV with optional dropout" ideas as well as a scenario with a 50-50 mix of near-honest and strategic range voters. Anyhow, among the methods tried, (near-honest) RANGE and the 50-50 honest-strategic range mix, clearly outperformed all other methods, but like I say this is a PRELIMINARY conclusion. You may wish to comment on the paper. To do so email warren.wds &at^ gmail.com. You may also wish to confirm it yourself by writing your own program. As I describe in the paper, everything is deterministic and done in exact arithmetic with no roundoff errors. Therefore, if you write your own program to perform the same calculation, you ought to get EXACTLY the same results. That would in fact be a very good and desirable check for the purpose of spotting bugs in (either) of our programs. I will repost at some later point when and if I get confiedent enough to anoint this as a "final" draft, so caveat emptor for now. Warren D. Smith http://www.rangevoting.org ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info