At 01:42 PM 8/26/2006, Warren Smith wrote: >Yes, it does bear some resemblance to A.Lomax's proxy ideas. >I too have devoted some thought to these ideas.
Warren, it should be noted, appears to have independently invented Asset Voting, which is effectively a single-user delegable proxy (DP) system used as an election method. It is my favorite method for selecting a peer assembly (all members have equal voting power) with a minimum of wasted votes. >However, I suspect Lomax's ideas are better and Lanphier's >worse. Or I understand neither. I've tried, perhaps too much... :-) I think that Warren may have misjudged Rob Lanphier's ideas. However, let's see. >Specifically, as far as I understand it, with Lomax's proxies, you can >select anybody on the planet to be your proxy. Delegable Proxy is a general concept which could be applied in many different ways. However, I do assume that a proxy is freely chosen by the client, with a minimum of external restrictions. >With Lanphier's, you are a member of a group of 6. The membership >of that 6-set >was not selected by you. It was selected in some undescribed way by >the government, >perhaps randomly. Yes, this is a difference. When I wrote that there was a resemblance between Lanphier's concept and my early work with DP, I'm referring to an original idea of meetings of ten people which elected a representative who met with nine similar elected representatives, etc., with one meeting per day. If every group of ten elected the one whom, of their group, they most trusted, one could hold a Presidential election in ten days. I did not keep this idea for very long. As I just stated it, it is a majoritarian system, filtering out minority opinion near the base level, unless somehow the minorities can be organized into the lower level meetings. Further, I had come to recognize a fundamental problem of electoral democracy: if there are elections, there are losers, and, if what is being elected are representatives, there are then people not represented. A system like Asset Voting, used for full non-party proportional representation, does get around this. But Asset Voting is really a deliberative method, not a standard aggregative voting method. But, it hit me, what if, instead of a fixed structure with meetings of size N, there were a chaotic structure, a fractal, with meetings organized around a chosen representative. In other words, instead of starting with meetings and electing representatives, start with representatives and let those who choose the rep constitute meetings. Where a rep is chosen by too many people to hold a coherent meeting, the rep could choose members of his constituency to form a high-level meeting, and suggest that those who would like to continue to function as his constituency, but indirectly, choose one of these elevated members. Thus the proxy network, with manageable meeting size, is built simultaneously from the bottom and the top. The individual members always retain full choice, but that choice is made in communication with the proxies. Thus our standard suggested DP tool: a proxy list, which is simply a list of members who have named a proxy, the name of the proxy, and the *accceptance* of the proxy. In the systems we envision, the acceptance of the proxy is an important element; acceptance is an agreement to communicate directly. At least that is what I hope clients will come to expect. It is this communication that is the essence of DP. Voting is practically a detail. DP is a device for distribution *deliberation*, controlling noise and the work load of each member. What I see as a serious shortcoming of Mr. Lanphier's proposal is that far too many members must put in far too much effort. DP distributes the effort. When it is implemented in the Free Association context, we have assumed that all members retain the right of direct vote, when polls are taken, but -- and this is crucial -- not all members necessarily have the right to address a high-level meeting. When I was developing the concepts, the internet was not a factor. However, it all gets easier with the internet; a "meeting" can easily be, quite simply, a mailing list. Generally, I'd expect, higher-level meetings would be open, and especially the top-level meeting of an organization would be open, that is, anyone could join, but upon joining, subscribers would be on moderation, and it might even be that attempts of such a subscriber to send a message to the list would result in a response informing the member that such submissions are not accepted, that only qualified members of the list may post, but that any qualified member may receive a submission and agree to post it. "Qualified member" might mean someone holding a certain number of proxies, direct or indirect, or otherwise admitted by vote. And note that any member could vote. Whatever voting rights members have are absolute throughout the structure. So the restrictions on posting are those which have been accepted by, at least, a majority of members, and which continue to enjoy majority support. And those who don't like this restriction, for example, are quite welcome to form their own list. Because of the DP structure, if there are enough such members, they can send their own proxy or proxies to the top-level list. It's noise filtering, the very concern that led Lanphier to consider the system he described here. Lanphier does propose an assignment of people to meetings. Essential to good communication is rapport. Skilled people can get beyond that, but such skill is rare. It is an essential skill to function at a high level, but expecting this skill at base-level meetings is unrealistic. Thus Lanphier's system, if I've understood it, is vulnerable to premature filtering out of minority opinion. DP allows minorities -- of any kind -- to aggregate representation to a level commensurate with their numbers, bringing such representation to a level where the participants are more capable of integrating viewpoints to find consensus. The FA context makes this practically essential, for FAs don't in themselves, have any power. A majority vote in an FA means nothing unless there is a *true* majority willing to commit to the decision, and with the resources to implement it, because FAs leave power (votes in governmental elections, money, access to communication) firmly in the hands of the members. A mere majority, opposed by a determined minority, has little power, because the resources of the two factions may cancel each other out, if they both attempt to act in the world according to their factional opinion. However, to the extent that they can find consensus, their power becomes multiplied, the factions don't waste their resources fighting each other, more than necessary. To find consensus is a difficult process. The fixed hierarchy concept (concentration by a factor of 10 in my early thought and by 6 in Lanphier's proposal) was, in fact, derived from standard meeting process, where such breaking down of large groups into small ones came to be a common method in the 1970s and 1980s. Small groups can much more easily find consensus, full agreement, than large ones. As the group size increases, the time necessary to explore and find consensus increases exponentially, typically, until even modest intentional communities find that meetings become far too onerous a burden, except for the truly dedicated. But consensus *can* often be found, if it is valued and pursued. DP is a technique for organizing into manageable groups *without* top-level management of the process. >I may have just misrepresented Lomax or Lanphier or both. We shall >continue on >blithlely anyway. In fact, to avoid calling them "Lanphier's" and >"Lomax's" schemes >from now on we shall call them the "Govt's" vs the "People's" >selection schemes. I'll suggest that Lanphier's suggestion involves a set of rules, plus the machinery to implement those rules, which could be governmental. There are other possibilities. Let's call it a Top-Down Planned Hierarchy, using elections and election analysis to assign members to meetings within a fixed structure. By contrast, what I envision is, quite simply, Delegable Proxy, for the concept of the proxy implies free choice by the client, and it likewise implies a consent of the proxy to so act. However, a great deal will depend on the culture within which DP is operating. Large numbers of people choosing Clint Eastwood as their proxy -- for some reason Mr. Eastwood seems always to be the personality who comes to mind in this context, but nothing should be construed from that regarding my opinion of Mr. Eastwood -- with, perhaps, Mr. Eastwood accepting automatically (or a system which does not even bother to require acceptance) -- does not create the deliberative network that will make DP truly functional, it merely concentrates power, if used in a control structure. In the FA context, it wouldn't mean much of anything. >Now either way, the scheme continues hierarchically, reducing the population >by a factor of 6 (or whatever) each stage, until at the end we have >some manaegably small >legislature which makes decisions. This was my original concept, as applied to a single decision, the election of the President of the United States. It was thought that, at each point, the selection process involved those selecting having the opportunity to actually meet and discuss issues with those becoming members of the set of those who could be elected, and at each point, on a small scale. This concept, note, does not contemplate direct voting. FA/DP does. That is, any member of the FA who wishes may directly vote on any issue, even at a top level meeting. But I assume that, in a mature organization, the vast majority of votes would be cast through proxies. Direct voting might be retained in governmental DP. I see no harm in it; I think that, in governmental as well as in FA DP, direct voting will remain the exception. Direct voting is a way in which a member may easily make an exception to trusting the proxy. "I trust John very much, but he just has a bug about this topic, so I'll leave him as my proxy, but I'll cast my vote when I'm concerned." And, of course, that member might himself or herself be a proxy representing many members. >Now. The problem (I think) with Govt-selection, is (a) it is >highly manipulable >by some faction that gets control then amplifies their >control. This is kind of >like gerrymandering. Yes, there would be that danger, and it wouldn't be easy to detect. DP is practically invulnerable to this. And the FA context, outside of control structures like governments, would make attempts to manipulate, say by bribing proxies, highly expensive and probably futile. > And (b) if the govt-selection is done randomly, then >there is no gerrymandering, but it may lead to a horribly effective form of >massive-conformity, wherein ideas that are not "mainstream" are systematically >reduced each stage, resulting in exponential decrease by the time >the top of the >hierarchy is reached. It is kind of like the median voter is >selected each time to get >promoted one hierarchy level, and that causes, in a big hierachy, >the extremes of the >idea-spectrum to be totally filtered out extremely effectively. >(Try a computer sim if you do not believe me. The high levels of >the hierarchy will >have vastly reduced fraction of extremes.) My analysis exactly. >With, however, people-selection, a bunch of Wackos can get together >and promote >one of them to the next level, then they try to do so again next >level, etc, thus getting >Wacko representation even at high levels, and without >filtering out Wacko ideas. If the member registration is honest or validated, wacko views can only be represented by the number of votes held by wacko voters. Thinking of the DP process as involving "promotions" is ... off the point. I don't envision any fixed (imposed) set of meeting rules; I think, from my experience with FAs, that meetings will evolve their own rules as needed. Wacko ideas will get due consideration, and not much more than that. They will rise to the level where they may be exposed and their defects considered in depth, *plus* whatever value exists in them -- there is usually some value -- can be extracted and become part of an emerging consensus. >That is good. On the other hand it might go too far and lead to artificial >extremeness-amplification as we go up the hierarchy. I don't think so. I think that the structure, as envisioned, will naturally find a close balance. It *is* a noise-filtering structure, but with so many points of entry that new ideas will have a fair chance. As I've often written, if I can't convince my proxy, whom I chose because I trust his or her judgement, that my idea is a good one, maybe it isn't such a good idea. And if, on top of that, I can't convince anyone else (who could take it to another proxy), maybe it *really* is a lousy idea. While there will be bypasses, communication in DP will generally take place in small groups, and most essentially between client and direct proxy. I'll have my proxy's phone number (and he or she will have mine). The wacko idea can only advance if, given an opportunity for full discussion, it can continue to convince those who learn about it that it is worthy of higher consideration. >Also, note that if each 7-set (here assuming 7X reduction each level) >is 4 Wackos and 3 normal people, >then we get vastly more Wackos at high levels in the Hierarchy than if each >7-set had been 7 Wackos. This is the effect of "gerrymandering" I >was talking about. >Such gerrymandering could vastly manipulate things if externally >applied. If however >people-selection is employed, then the factions that "trick" their members >into arranging just the right gerrymandering (i.e. 4 Wackos >each stage, and 3 dumb normals who don't understand what is being done to them >thanks to a con job) will get exponentially tremendously more power at the >high levels. So there is a premium on recruiting dumb people. >So people-selection may also lead to problems. >But I suspect fewer problems. Let me put it this way: I certainly hope that the culture would come to suspect anyone who comes to you and says, "Let me represent you." Rather, I'd hope to see people seek out their proxy. Find the person involved in the organization whom you trust most and ask him or her to be your proxy. That person may well be too busy, but, in a mature organization, would have a means of suggesting to you someone who might be able to serve you as a proxy. You'd end up with your trustworthy person acting on your behalf at a high level, but also with someone chosen by that person with whom you can directly communicate. It is *very* important to realize that I'm proposing DP specifically in Free Associations. DP could have many other applications, but there are many untried aspects to DP, many possible ways in which unexpected consequences to arise. The FA context has a huge built-in safeguard: FAs are thoroughly libertarian, non-coercive organizations. There can be no tyranny of the majority in an FA. If that wacko faction manages to take over the FA, the sane people, who already have a proxy network in place, simply reconstitute themselves as an independent organization, and can cheerfully ignore the wackiness. FAs, thus, can fission easily. But, guess what? The structure is the outcome. FAs fissioning simply extends the possibilities, for two fissioned FAs are still easily connected, all it takes is one proxy from one acting in the other. Similarly, separate FAs, without any top-level decision, can easily merge *in effect*, simply by extending cross-membership, and, again, it only takes a few members to do this. This is why the DP structure, combined with the FA concept, could be so revolutionary. You'd think that Libertarians would jump for it. And, indeed, some of them might be. FA/DP is rigorously libertarian, that is, the organization is utterly non-coercive, it does not even take your dues and spend it as decided by a majority, except for minimal operating expenses, it certainly does not spend your dues on controversial measures. FA/DP organizations are not gatekeepers; they facilitate but they cannot control. (Many organizations might claim this, but, in fact, structurally there are a small number of people who control general communication between members. The members, if they thought the organization were out-of-control or abusive, could not, except with extreme effort and struggle, reform themselves as a new organization. But FA/DP members could easily do this, and the fact that they could do this is the greatest protection against hijacking of an FA/DP organization by a special interest.) (But, of course Libertarians, that is, the Libertarian Party, are advocating the application of libertarian principles in government. What I say to them is, if those principles will work in government, if they are practical there, why not use them in a voluntary, peer organization, where, by design, there can be no coercion? FA/DP is "libertarian" but an FA/DP organization would have no opinion, as an organization, as to whether or not governments should be Libertarian. But they *will* be testing the concepts....) ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
