IEVS ran for a few days using honest voters and random normal utilities. I have now also implemented Venzke's "vote for and against" method (which is not the same as mine) under the name "VenzkeDisqPlur"; and Condorcet//Approval and UncoveredSet, bringing us up to 39 voting methods. (Your contributions will be welcomed...) But none of those were written when I ran this sim. [It appears with honest voters VenzkeDisqPlur is better than Plurality but worse than Top2Runoff, becoming the same as Plurality if there are a lot of candidates; UncoveredSet is better than the Smith and Schwartz sets, but not by much.]
Strategic voting is not yet ready to roll. However, you can for example regard "honest-approval" as the same thing as "strategic range voting" (which by the way is not quite true...) and hence are in a position to make some comparisons. You will find, for example, that under the sim conditions strategic zero-info range is superior to honest Bucklin, honest DMC, honest Raynaud, honest SmithIRV, and honest IRV, which seems a severe indictment of those systems and is contrary to many peoples' intuition. For example (just to rub that in), Chris Benham has at various times informed me that ER-Bucklin, SmithIRV, and DMC were his favorite methods and he disliked Range voting because of its strategic properties, in particular the fact zero-info strategic range voting is not the same as honest range voting. But the sim shows that even with fully honest voters, all of those Benham-favored systems perform worse than Range even with 100% strategic (zero-info) voters. I conclude from this that the zero-info honesty criterion can and does mislead you! Source code: Here are some results. (NumVoters=1535, NumCands=7, NumElections=1999999, IgnoranceAmplitude=0.001000) The voting methods with BayesianRegret < 10 have * and those with BR<6 have **. Method, & BayesianRegrets & #Agreements with Condorcet Winner (when CW exists) 0=SociallyBest 0 909726 ** 1=SociallyWorst 105.95 115 2=RandomWinner 52.9372 180594 3=Plurality 21.0808 572465 4=Borda 4.54339 1063164 ** 5=IRV 11.4525 1071832 6=Approval 9.57248 820661 * 7=Range 2.34923 968687 ** 8=SchulzeBeatpaths 7.65854 1262175 * 9=SmithSet 15.1901 1262175 10=SchwartzSet 15.1545 1262175 11=CondorcetLR 7.34944 1262175 * 12=Top2Runoff 14.0468 860532 13=SimpsonKramer 7.80134 1262175 * 14=Bucklin 12.3466 835287 15=Copeland 8.2384 1262175 * 16=SimmonsCond 7.94824 1262175 * 17=SmithIRV 9.7471 1262175 * 18=BTRIRV 9.18064 1262175 * 19=DMC 10.8252 1262175 20=Dabagh 13.9448 747406 21=VtForAgainst 11.6002 757580 22=AntiPlurality 21.7252 550365 23=PlurIR 14.0468 860532 24=Black 5.6356 1262175 ** 25=RandomBallot 51.6386 191308 26=RandomPair 37.874 334004 27=NansonBaldwin 9.50171 1262175 28=Nauru 10.427 835902 29=TopMedianRating 8.95933 775247 30=LoMedianRank 52.9952 180459 31=RaynaudElim 10.3868 1262175 32=ArrowRaynaud 8.03927 1254525 * 33=Sinkhorn 4.54255 1061707 ** 34=KeenerEig 4.54734 1066258 ** 35=MDDA 7.56647 1262175 * (NumVoters=1535, NumCands=3, NumElections=1999999, IgnoranceAmplitude=0.001000) The voting methods with BayesianRegret < 6 have *. Method, & BayesianRegrets & #Agreements with Condorcet Winner (when CW exists) 0=SociallyBest 0 1353746 * 1=SociallyWorst 66.2759 79391 2=RandomWinner 33.1834 607348 3=Plurality 8.78614 1389914 4=Borda 5.0884 1644984 * 5=IRV 6.82907 1757694 6=Approval 5.1228 1381587 * 7=Range 3.81388 1528868 * 8=SchulzeBeatpaths 6.00479 1825359 9=SmithSet 6.69801 1825359 10=SchwartzSet 6.6996 1825359 11=CondorcetLR 6.00539 1825359 12=Top2Runoff 6.8306 1757781 13=SimpsonKramer 6.00364 1825359 14=Bucklin 8.92371 1374589 15=Copeland 6.69666 1825359 16=SimmonsCond 6.51225 1825359 17=SmithIRV 6.51254 1825359 18=BTRIRV 6.19843 1825359 19=DMC 6.6959 1825359 20=Dabagh 5.10445 1645045 * 21=VtForAgainst 5.06958 1645046 * 22=AntiPlurality 8.92968 1374611 23=PlurIR 6.8306 1757781 24=Black 5.78931 1825359 * 25=RandomBallot 32.3044 629469 26=RandomPair 21.4056 1014263 27=NansonBaldwin 6.44418 1825359 28=Nauru 6.17584 1551182 29=TopMedianRating 5.12254 1381527 * 30=LoMedianRank 33.3714 602651 31=RaynaudElim 6.70031 1825359 32=ArrowRaynaud 6.00212 1825359 33=Sinkhorn 5.08644 1636869 * 34=KeenerEig 5.09094 1653486 * 35=MDDA 5.65242 1825359 * Warren D Smith http://rangevoting.org ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info