Warren Smith wrote:
Benham: By this definition Range fails "ICC" because voters can only express
preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of
them, thus making it
possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the
clones lose.
--no. The definition in the problem statement said "slight" preferences among
clones.
By slight, I meant, to be formal, infinitesimal.
Right. And how does a voter express an "infinitesimal" preference in
the Range 0-99 that you advocate?
499: A99
251: B99>C98
250: C99>B98
Range average scores: A49.401, B49.349, C49.348
A wins, but if the {B,C} clone set is coalesced into a single candidate
X, X wins. This is an FPP-like failure of
Clone-Winner, and BTW also of course a failure of Majority for
Solid Coalitions (and Condorcet).
499: A99
501: X99
Range average scores: X49.599, A49.401
Apart from that, I gather that Range with fewer available ratings
slots also qualifies as "Range Voting", so
of course in that case it is even more difficult for the voter to
express infinitesimal preferences.
Chris Benham
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