Scott Ritchie:
So, wait, was half the Condorcet electorate strategic voting by doing
order reversal? Are we making the assumption that strategic voting is
exactly as common in range and Condorcet in these simulations?
That seems a bit strong, exactly because the risks are different and the
information required is greater for Condorcet.
--WDS:
In IEVS, presently, equal rankings are forbidden in rank-order methods.
Hence all strategic voting in them involves some order changing whenever the
strategic
vote is not the honest one.
M.O.:
which (like Warrens other assumptions) makes the results meaningless.
Warren continues:
I would not say I am "making the assumption that strategic voting is
exactly as common in range and Condorcet in these simulations."
You are free to make that assumption if you want. I am simply computing
the data of what the Bayesian Regrets (and probabilities of electing
true-Condorcet-Winners)
of different election methods are, at different honesty-strategy mixes in
the voter population.
At 50-50 mix, range leads to higher CW probability than Condorcet methods.
M.O.
which is entirely worthless without the assumption that voters are equally
sincere in both methods.
honest voters
(whatever they are - it is rather hard in practice to tell who is who, they
all
say they are honest if asked; and nothing stops voters from providing votes
which include both
honesty and strategy inside the same vote)
M.O.
So use a method that doesnt force dishonesty, a method with which the voter
has less need for strategy.
then if you provide a good definition of it I may
include it in a future version of IEVS. I want to incorporate help and
advice from you all.
M.O.
I offer this help: If Warren wants to make RV look good, then hed be
well-advised to not compare it to Condorcet. Continuing to do so will only
make RV look really shabby.
Wds:
I will say, though, that personally I really
do not give a damn about how "unfair" an election method is (and indeed am
not even sure what "unfairness" even is); what I care about is how much
society benefits
or not, quantitatively, from the election result. If election method A
causes expected societal benefit +999 and B causes benefit -999, where
"benefit" is
a well defined quantitative thing that we all agree is better to make larger
-
then I will prefer A even if some whiner comes along and says in his opinion
A was
"more unfair."
M.O.
Its been long understood on EM that unfairness, such as the need for
insincere voting, is very bad news for social utility. You cant expect to
get good SU unless people are voting in accordance with their genuine
preferences.
The familiar lesser-of-2-evils problem causes people to sacrifice
sincerity for perceived pragmatism. What is the lesser-of-2-evils problem?
It is the fear of fully voting X over Y, because then one cant fully vote Y
over Z. Guess what?: RV has the lesser-of-2-evils problem in a transparently
obvious way, in a big way that Condorcet doesnt have.
Mike Ossipoff
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