Are apportionment academics related to voting-system academics?

You have probably noticed a certain cluelessness about voting-system academics. I’ve been checking out some apportionment writing on the Internet, and apparently academics who write about apportionment share that cluelessness.

The emphasis seems to be on two-state transfer properties. You’re not going to believe this, but it never seems to occur to academic authors that maybe equal representation expectation could be a good thing, or that there’s anything wrong with systematically giving more s/q to states at one end of the population-size spectrum.

Alright, I admit that that conclusion is based on a limited look at their writing. But if academic interest in equal representation expectation is difficult to find, surely that says something unflattering.

Sure, the pair transfer properties sound plausible enough, if, by whatever standard, no two states could be closer. But what would you say about someone who scrutinizes transfer properties, seemingly ignoring the fact that it’s theoretically and empirically obvious that Hill’s method systematically gives more seats per quota to the smaller states? I mean, what kind of a person must that academic be? A bumbling comic character like Jerry Lewis’s Nutty Professor? Again, the term “head-up-the-ass” suggests itself.

The Constitution says that seats should be given according to population, and this is interpreted to mean proportional to population. Systematically giving more s/q to smaller states (or bigger states) is obviously the most unfair violation of that proportionality requirement.

As you know from single-winner methods, all criteria sound plausible. But are the transfer properties so plausible as to justify systematic s/q disparity with respect to population? Someone has seriously lost track
of the point of proportional apportionment.

Webster is the divisor method that gives equal representation expectation for everyone, disregarding the effects of a non-uniform state-size probability distribution. Webster is the intrinsically unbiased divisor method, even if something extrinsic like the probability distribution could cause measured bias.

That can be shown as I described earlier. When I found out about my Bias-Free fallacy, I set out to find the intrinsically unbiased divisor method. Write expressions for the total number of quotas possessed, and the total number of seats received, by the states in a some particular “cycle”, between two whole numbers of Hare quotas, such as the set of states possessing between 4 and 5 Hare quotas. Set those two expressions equal, and solve for the rounding point between those integers.

When I did that, I got (a+b)/2, which is a + .5   That’s Webster ‘s method.

Why doesn’t it occur to the bumbling, comic, clueless, head-up-the-ass nutty professors that it might be desirable for everyone to have equal representation expectation? And that there’s something seriously wrong when residents of smaller states systematically receive more representation than residents of large states?

I’ve suggested that measured bias caused by the distribution isn’t unfair in the sense that measured bias caused by the method is unfair. If that’s correct, then Webster could be all we need.

But it could be desirable to actually get rid of measured bias, whatever its cause, and that’s why I, and then Warren, have been looking at ways of doing that. I’ve proposed three such methods, and have named them Weighted Webster, Cycle-Webster, and Adjusted-Rounding.

Getting back to transfer properties, of course Webster has one.

Mike Ossipoff


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