Mike, --- Michael Ossipoff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > By the way, for the kind of approach that youre doing, it might be > better > for the privileged balloting system to be ratings instead of rankings.
This is fine. It makes hardly any difference, so let's suppose that the "privileged" balloting system is ratings with infinite resolution. Here is a concise description of my scheme then. 1. The input to any election method is a ballot under the privileged balloting system. A method can't choose to limit acceptable input here. 2. If the method practically doesn't accept just any ballot under the privileged balloting system, then treat it as though the election method includes the explicit step of converting the cast ballots into legal ballots. This conversion is arbitrary and changes the original ballots minimally. (I could go into more detail on what I mean by "arbitrary.") Even when ratings are the privileged balloting system, there are still three ways to interpret Approval, so I'll consider Range instead. Suppose the rated ballots are in these quantities and have these preferences: 3 C>A>B 5 A>B>C 4 B>A=C What I use instead of SFC requires here that B not be elected, as there is no majority for any candidate over A, and there is a majority for A over B. Suppose that the specific ratings cast are 3 C:1.0, A:0.1, B:0.0 5 A:1.0, B:0.9, C:0.0 4 B:1.0, A and C:0.0 If the method is Range then B is elected in violation of this criterion. The advantage of this scheme is that, if you use it, you can phrase criteria briefly, and it's easy to apply them when trying to determine whether a method satisfies or fails them. (This is more obvious with SDSC or FBC than with SFC as SFC doesn't prescribe merely that under some circumstances some way of voting must exist.) The advantage of sincere preference criteria is e.g. that it is not so ambiguous how to interpret Approval. I don't think you can decisively conclude that Approval fails majority favorite without using a version that uses sincere preferences. My problem with my scheme is that Approval is ambiguous. My problem with using sincere preference criteria all the time is that I find it awkward to always word things as though I have no idea what kind of method I'm talking about. Kevin Venzke ___________________________________________________________________________ Découvrez une nouvelle façon d'obtenir des réponses à toutes vos questions ! Profitez des connaissances, des opinions et des expériences des internautes sur Yahoo! Questions/Réponses http://fr.answers.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info