Forest--
Alright, but the C voters are still truncating their approval, arent they? They still need that strategy in order to put the choice to the A voters about accepting the Nash equilibrium or else. True, the C voters dont have to abandon A to the degree that theyd have to in wv. So they dont need as drastic a strategy against offensive order-reversal as theyd need in wv. (Truncation didnt seem drastic until its compared to the only-partial truncation of UncAAO).
Now, if UncAAO meets (what I consider) the deluxe rank-method criteria, SFC and SDSC, that means that, while reducing the amount of defensive strategy needed against offensive order-reversal, UncAAO retains the full advantages that a rank method can have over Approval.
Maybe this is one of those times when something is found that is a little better than what was believed possible.
If the strategy in your example always works, then that probably means that UncAAO meets SDSC. But what about SFC?
Well, GSFC would be even better than SFC, but SFC would be good enough. I have other questions about UncAAO, but Ill save them for another posting. Mike Ossipoff
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