Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> Chris-- > > You wrote: > > > Mike, > Does this compromising "one C voter" have to unapprove C? > > I reply: > > No. > > Referring to this example, > > 52: AC (offensive order-reversal) > 100: BA > 50: C/B > > > > You continued: > > A>C>B>A. Approvals: A152, C102, B100. A>C 152-50, C>B 102-100, B>A 150-52 > DMC and ASM elect A. > > I reply: > > > You continued: > > Here if one C|B changes to B|C > > I reply: > > It doesn’t matter if it’s B/C or BC, because, as I said, the approval > votes don’t come into play, because there’s already an unbeaten > candidate, B, who therefore wins. > > You continued: > > then DMC just becomes indecisive with B and C on the same approval > score and pairwise tied. > > I reply: > > Pairwise tied, yes. Indecisive, no. B wins because B is the only > unbeaten candidate. According to DMC’s rules, B wins. > > If the C voters vote BC, approving both, then, as you said, they make > a pair-wise tie between B and C. B beats A and pair-ties C. B wins as > the only unbeaten candidate. The Approval scores don’t come into play, > because there already is an unbeaten candidate. At least that’s how I > understood the rules of DMC: If no one is unbeaten, repeatedly > eliminate the least-approved candidate till someone is unbeaten. Yes, that is doubtless the best way: elect the Schwartz winner. > If I’ve misunderstood DMC’s rules, tell me the correct DMC rules. No, looks like my mistake. I'll give some reply to the rest later. Chris Benham > > > ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info