Dear Mike, you wrote: > Now, if DAMC meets GSFC, then it has an advantage that I value, over > MDDA & MAMPO--but at great cost in complexity. And it's not dominated > by wv Condorcet, because it trades Condorcet's Criterion for > expectation FBC.
I think it does: Assume an absolute majority prefers X to Y and votes sincerely. Then X has an absolute majority defeat against Y. If also X but not Y is in the sincere Smith set, then Y has no absolute majority sized beatpath against X. Hence the only reason why the defeat X>Y could be skipped by DAMC would be if an even stronger defeat Z>Y is "locked in". Either way, Y ends up having a defeat against it locked in, and will therefore not win. Q.E.D. Yours, Jobst
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