Juho wrote:
>On Mar 14, 2007, at 19:23 , Chris Benham wrote: > > > >>Juho wrote: >> >> >> >>>Here's one more election method for you to consider.... >>> >>>Let's start from a Condorcet method (it doesn't matter much which >>>one). Then we allow the candidates to form groups. Each group will >>>be handled as if it was a single candidate. >>> >>> >>> >>I reject this on the same grounds that I reject the "candidate >>withdrawal option" (in say IRV) and >>"Asset Voting": I am only interested in single-winner methods >>where the result is purely determined >>(as far as possible) by voters voting, and not by the machinations >>of candidates/parties. >> >>Chris Benham >> >> > >That sounds quite strict. The voters still have all the power >although the algorithm threats different candidates slightly >different (depending on what the candidate tree looks like). A >majority of the voters can pick any candidate they want. > >Note that it is very typical in elections that the parties will >decide on what candidates will be offered to the voters to choose >from in any case. So the parties will have some impact in most >elections anyway. They may arrange preliminaries, decide if they >nominate more than one candidate etc. > Yes of course, but I don't regard the nomination process as part of the election method. >How about multi-winner elections - do you say that open and closed >list elections are no good and only flat candidate structures like in >STV, are ok? > I regard STV as vastly preferable, but list systems can be partly excused because they achieve approximate party-proportionality with much greater simplicity and maybe philosophically we can regard a whole list as a "candidate" with the special feature that it can be fractionally elected. >I see candidate withdrawal related problems to be quite different >from what I see in the proposed three based method. The biggest >problem I see in candidate withdrawal is that if the person/group >that makes the decision on withdrawal already knows the given votes, >then it is possible to decide the winner in a small group, partially >bypassing the opinions that the voters expressed in the ballots. This >also opens the door to horse trading or even blackmailing. The >proposed method at least is based on giving full information to the >voters already before the election and letting the voters decide. > Yes, I agree that your idea (with everything up front before the vote) is much better (less bad) that CWO. >Maybe you have some examples where the proposed method would behave >in some unacceptable way. That would help evaluating what the method >is good for. > I have none to hand, but like I said, it doesn't interest me. Chris Benham ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
